holding, in the lead opinion as described below, that under the Pennsylvania Constitution an accused could not be impeached with his prior voluntary, but suppressed, statements; abrogated by subsequent amendment
How later courts described this case
- holding, in the lead opinion as described below, that under the Pennsylvania Constitution an accused could not be impeached with his prior voluntary, but suppressed, statements; abrogated by subsequent amendment
- diverging, under the lead opinion, from Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), and concluding that use of suppressed but voluntary statements to impeach a defendant’s testimony violated Article I, Section 9, later abrogated by constitutional amendment
- diverging, under the lead opinion, from Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), and concluding that use of suppressed but voluntary statements to impeach a defendant’s testimony violated Article I, Section 9, later abrogated by constitutional amendment
- holding confession obtained as the result of a violation of Miranda rights could not be used to impeach an accused's denial of guilt at trial
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Bodge, 256 Pa. Super. 376 (1978)
Our supreme court refused, to apply the decision in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), and held that where “any statement of a defendant [is] declared inadmissible for any reason by a suppression court[,] [it] cannot be used for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a defendant who elects to testify on his own behalf at trial.” 462 Pa. at 248-49, 341 A.2d at 64. Triplett is in…
The opinion
EAGEN, Justice
(dissenting).
The trial in this case was nonjury. The evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Even assuming the trial court erred in permitting the appellant to be cross-examined concerning prior inconsistent statements which had been suppressed pretrial, I am convinced the error was harmless under the circumstances.