holding, in the lead opinion as described below, that under the Pennsylvania Constitution an accused could not be impeached with his prior voluntary, but suppressed, statements; abrogated by subsequent amendment
How later courts described this case
- holding, in the lead opinion as described below, that under the Pennsylvania Constitution an accused could not be impeached with his prior voluntary, but suppressed, statements; abrogated by subsequent amendment
- diverging, under the lead opinion, from Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), and concluding that use of suppressed but voluntary statements to impeach a defendant’s testimony violated Article I, Section 9, later abrogated by constitutional amendment
- diverging, under the lead opinion, from Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), and concluding that use of suppressed but voluntary statements to impeach a defendant’s testimony violated Article I, Section 9, later abrogated by constitutional amendment
- holding confession obtained as the result of a violation of Miranda rights could not be used to impeach an accused's denial of guilt at trial
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Bodge, 256 Pa. Super. 376 (1978)
Our supreme court refused, to apply the decision in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), and held that where “any statement of a defendant [is] declared inadmissible for any reason by a suppression court[,] [it] cannot be used for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a defendant who elects to testify on his own behalf at trial.” 462 Pa. at 248-49, 341 A.2d at 64. Triplett is in…
The opinion
OPINION OF THE COURT
O’BRIEN, Justice.
Appellant, Lawrence Triplett, a Philadelphia police officer, was tried by a judge sitting without a jury and found guilty of burglary, larceny and receiving stolen *246 goods. Post-trial motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to a term of “one and one-half to five years in a state correctional institution. An appeal to the Superior Court resulted in an affirmance of appellant’s conviction. We granted allocatur and now reverse.
The facts surrounding this appeal are as follows: On December 25, 1971, a burglary occurred at the Delmonico warehouse in the City of Philadelphia. Appellant and another police officer, in response to a radio call, proceeded to the warehouse. After their arrival at the scene, appellant and a fellow officer, finding no one in the warehouse, removed for their own benefit eight television sets. During the course of the removal of the television sets, appellant and his fellow officers were confronted by other members of the Philadelphia police force, who at trial testified that they saw appellant assist in the removal of the television sets. As a result of this conduct, appellant was taken before his police superiors and questioned. He was then arrested and convicted of the crimes of burglary, larceny and receiving stolen goods.
We granted allocatur in this case to determine whether the decision of Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 , 91 S. Ct. 643 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) is applicable to the instant case, and whether this jurisdiction should follow the ruling of Harris .
The Harris decision became relevant in the instant ease in the following manner. As a result of appellant’s actions at the Delmonico warehouse, he was called to police headquarters and questioned by his superiors. Before the questioning of appellant began, he was given “charter warnings,” which consisted of “I wish to inform you that this is an official investigation, and under the provisions of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, Section 10-110, you are required to cooperate fully and *247 answer all questions. Do you understand?” Section 10-110 of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter reads as follows:
“If any officer or employee of the City shall willfully refuse or fail to appear before any court, or before the Council, or any committee thereof, or before any officer, department, board, commission or body authorized to conduct any hearing or inquiry, or having appeared, shall refuse to testify or to answer any question relating to the affairs or government of the City or the conduct of any City officer or employee on the ground that his testimony or answers would tend to incriminate him, or shall refuse to waive immunity from prosecution on account of any matter about which he may be asked to testify before such court or at any such hearing or inquiry, he shall forfeit his office or position, and shall not be eligible thereafter for employment to any position in the City service”.
Lt. Margulis, who conducted the initial questioning of appellant, stated that appellant, through his police training, was completely familiar with Section 10-110 of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter and the consequences of a police officer’s failure to answer the questions posed to him. As a result of the initial interview, appellant made certain admissions concerning his participation in the warehouse incident. Subsequent to the interview preceded by the charter warnings, appellant was given full Miranda warnings and made statements again admitting his participation in the warehouse burglary. Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress all statements he gave during the interview preceded by charter warnings and those statements preceded by Miranda warnings. The suppression court, on the basis of Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 , 87 S.Ct. 616 , 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967) and Commonwealth v. Ware, 438 Pa. 517 , 265 A.2d 790 (1970), suppressed all statements made by appellant. However, at trial the Commonwealth, on the basis of *248 Harris, supra, used the suppressed statements to impeach appellant’s trial testimony.
Initially, we must point out that in our opinion, the statements made by appellant which were preceded by the charter warnings were properly suppressed by the court below. In Garrity, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States was presented with the issue of wheth- ■ er statements made by a police officer, who was compelled to answer questions based on a statute similar to the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, Section 10-110, were inadmissible at a state criminal trial of the officer. We are in agreement with the rationale of Garrity and, therefore, conclude that the initial statements were properly suppressed. The court below then held that appellant’s ' statements which were made after he was given his Miranda warnings were also inadmissible because the statements, although preceded by Miranda warnings, were directly related to the prior constitutionally infirm statements and, therefore, inadmissible as being the product of the prior constitutionally infirm statements. We also agree with that determination. Moreover, the Commonwealth, in this appeal, does not dispute the propriety of the suppression court’s decision, but only argues that Harris should be and is the law of -this Commonwealth.
Since this court has not directly spoken on the issue of whether Harris is to be applied in this Commonwealth, we feel it necessary to decide the issue in terms that will resolve the question in all situations. In Harris , the Supreme Court of the United States allowed the use of constitutionally infirm statements to impeach the credibility of a criminal defendant’s trial testimony if the infirm statement was obtained under circumstances that would not detract from the trustworthiness of the statement.
We are of the opinion that any statement of a defendant declared inadmissible for any reason by a suppres *249 sion court cannot be used for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a defendant who elects to testify on his own behalf at trial. This result is premised upon the logic espoused in the concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Woods, 455 Pa. 1, 7 , 312 A.2d 357, 360 (1973) wherein Mr. Justice Roberts, joined by the writer of this opinion and Mr. Justice Nix, stated:
“Harris-type use of constitutionally infirm confessions forces upon an accused a grisly Hobson’s choice. Either an accused must forgo his right to testify, or he must risk the sure and devastating prejudice occasioned by the prosecution’s use of the impermissibly obtained confession at the critical rebuttal stage.”
Lastly, we must point out that our prohibition against the use of constitutionally infirm statements to impeach the credibility of a criminal defendant testifying in his own behalf is premised upon Pennsylvania Constitution Article I, Section 9, P.S.
Judgment of sentence reversed, and case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
POMEROY, J., filed a concurring opinion.
JONES, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion.
EAGEN, J., filed a dissenting opinion.