distinguishing federal labor relations law from Pennsylvania public sector labor law in part because “the term ‘impasse’ [as] used in public sector law under [Act 195] ... can also mean the end of the statutory dispute resolution process, as well as deadlock,” and citing Article VIII of Act 195 as illustrative
How later courts described this case
- distinguishing federal labor relations law from Pennsylvania public sector labor law in part because “the term ‘impasse’ [as] used in public sector law under [Act 195] ... can also mean the end of the statutory dispute resolution process, as well as deadlock,” and citing Article VIII of Act 195 as illustrative
- “policy considerations are within the Board’s expertise and deference to that expertise is required”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
COLINS, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the eloquent and well-researched opinion of Judge Doyle for two reasons.
First, I disagree that the General Assembly has invested the Board with the sole and conclusive authority of interpreting public policy under PERA. This Court and ultimately the Supreme Court are vested with the constitutional authority and responsibility of interpreting the declared public policy intent of any legislation and deciding what parameters shall be placed upon any quasi-judicial body’s ability to interpret legislation applicable to all citizens of the Commonwealth. In Metropolitan Property and Liability Insurance Company v. Insurance Commissioner, we stated that “[w]hen the words of a statute are not explicit, this Court must ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 97 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 219 , 222, 509 A.2d 1346 , 1348 (1986), affirmed, 517 Pa. 218 , 535 A.2d 588 (1987).
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has observed: “Undoubtedly questions of statutory interpretation, especially when arising in the first instance in judicial proceedings, are for the courts to resolve, giving appropriate weight to the *35 judgment of those whose special duty is to administer the questioned statute.” National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. Ill, 130-131, 64 S.Ct. 851, 860 , 88 L.Ed. 1170 (1944).
In the instant matter, the Board is delegated the exclusive function to decide cases arising under PERA in the first instance. Appeal of Cumberland Valley School District, 483 Pa. 134 , 394 A.2d 946 (1978). However, this delegation of authority does not mandate that the courts abdicate their responsibility and authority to interpret PERA. The trial court acted within this authority when it concluded that the Board made errors of law.
Second, the ramifications of the instant opinion create a precedent that compels municipal corporations or authorities to continue to operate indefinitely under expired labor agreements regardless of the financial impossibility of doing so. To compel any municipality to maintain financial commitments in perpetuity in the face of a declining population or a shrinking tax base or any other adverse circumstance, creates a precedent in this Commonwealth which is most dangerous and is contrary to the public interest.
As the majority acknowledges, PERA limits public employees’ right to strike in recognition of the negative impact on the public when government services are not forthcoming. This limitation on the right to strike, however, does more than simply protect the public; it achieves a tenuous balance in bargaining power between the public sector employer and public employees. The majority’s decision weakens PERA’s limitation on public employees’ right to strike and accordingly threatens the delicate balance of bargaining power between employer and employee in the public sector.
I would affirm the opinion of the trial court in the instant matter.
KELLEY, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.