aside from intentional acts of a third person intended to injure an employee for reasons personal to him, the Act provides an injured worker with an exclusive remedy at law; in essence the Act is based on a theory of trade-offs: the employer is forced to surrender the numerous defenses which may be available at common law; however, the injured employee’s recourse is strictly confined to those remedies provided by the Act
How later courts described this case
- aside from intentional acts of a third person intended to injure an employee for reasons personal to him, the Act provides an injured worker with an exclusive remedy at law; in essence the Act is based on a theory of trade-offs: the employer is forced to surrender the numerous defenses which may be available at common law; however, the injured employee’s recourse is strictly confined to those remedies provided by the Act
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JOHNSON, Judge,
dissenting.
For the reasons set forth in my Dissenting Opinion in Rosipal v. Montgomery Ward, 360 Pa.Super. 570 , 521 A.2d 49 (1987), and because I continue to believe that Kuney v. PMA Insurance Company, 379 Pa.Super. 598 , 550 A.2d 1009 (1989) (pet. for alloc, filed at 241 E.D. Allocatur Docket 1989, 3-13-89) is a correct statement of the law, I must dissent.
I cannot believe that our legislature intended the use of the word “injury” in the Workers’ Compensation Act to encompass intentional fraudulent acts of insurance companies and their employes designed to deny benefits due Pennsylvania workers.. Cf., Reed v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 367 F.Supp. 134 (E.D.Pa.1973).
MELINSON, J., joins.