holding that injunction preventing Willing from carrying a "sandwich-board" sign denouncing her former lawyers, while ringing a cowbell and blowing a whistle, was an impermissible prior restraint under the state constitution as Willing had a right "to freely speak her opinion regardless of whether that opinion is based on fact or fantasy."
How later courts described this case
- holding that injunction preventing Willing from carrying a "sandwich-board" sign denouncing her former lawyers, while ringing a cowbell and blowing a whistle, was an impermissible prior restraint under the state constitution as Willing had a right "to freely speak her opinion regardless of whether that opinion is based on fact or fantasy."
- concluding that the orders enjoining the appellant from further demonstrating and/or picketing were clearly prohibited by Article I, Section 7, and by Goldman Theatres, supra, regardless of the truthfulness of her speech
- holding that a permanent injunction against 14 defamatory speech violated a provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution that is substantially similar to Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution
- holding that a permanent type of harm does not rise to the level necessary for the injunction against defamatory speech violated a provision prior restraint to withstand constitutional scrutiny."
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Terminix International Co. v. Kay, 150 F.R.D. 532 (1993)
Plaintiff now argues that, in any event, Willing and Kramer are distinguishable from the instant case in that in those cases movants were seeking a permanent injunction, while here plaintiff was only seeking a temporary one.
The opinion
EAGEN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons articulated in my dissenting opinion in Wm. Goldman Theatres v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83 , 173 A.2d 59 , cert. denied, 368 U.S. 897 , 82 S.Ct. 174 , 7 L.Ed.2d 93 (1961).