holding that injunction preventing Willing from carrying a "sandwich-board" sign denouncing her former lawyers, while ringing a cowbell and blowing a whistle, was an impermissible prior restraint under the state constitution as Willing had a right "to freely speak her opinion regardless of whether that opinion is based on fact or fantasy."
How later courts described this case
- holding that injunction preventing Willing from carrying a "sandwich-board" sign denouncing her former lawyers, while ringing a cowbell and blowing a whistle, was an impermissible prior restraint under the state constitution as Willing had a right "to freely speak her opinion regardless of whether that opinion is based on fact or fantasy."
- concluding that the orders enjoining the appellant from further demonstrating and/or picketing were clearly prohibited by Article I, Section 7, and by Goldman Theatres, supra, regardless of the truthfulness of her speech
- holding that a permanent injunction against 14 defamatory speech violated a provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution that is substantially similar to Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution
- holding that a permanent type of harm does not rise to the level necessary for the injunction against defamatory speech violated a provision prior restraint to withstand constitutional scrutiny."
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Terminix International Co. v. Kay, 150 F.R.D. 532 (1993)
Plaintiff now argues that, in any event, Willing and Kramer are distinguishable from the instant case in that in those cases movants were seeking a permanent injunction, while here plaintiff was only seeking a temporary one.
The opinion
*384 ROBERTS, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Manderino that appellant’s indigency does not justify the Superior Court’s radical departure from the long-standing general rule that equity will not enjoin a defamation. In Heilman v. Union Canal Company, 37 Pa. 100, 104 (1860), this Court said:
“The fact, if it be so, that this remedy may not be successful in realizing the fruits of a recovery at law, on account of the insolvency of the defendants, is not of itself a ground of equitable interference. The remedy is what is to be looked at. If it exist [sic], and is ordinarily adequate, its possible want of success is not a consideration.”
See also, Derry Township School District v. Barnett, 332 Pa. 174, 177 , 2 A.2d 758, 760 (1938); Bersch v. Rust, 249 Pa. 512, 514 , 95 A. 108 (1915). Money damages are adequate to recompense the plaintiffs for any losses they have suffered as a consequence of the defendant’s defamatory publication. Thus, it was improper to grant equitable relief based on appellant’s presumed inability to pay a money judgment.
As a consequence of holding that the defendant’s indigency creates equitable jurisdiction, the Superior Court conditions appellant’s right to trial by jury on her economic status. One of the underlying justifications for equity’s traditional refusal to enjoin defamatory speech is that in equity all questions of fact are resolved by the trial court, rather than the jury. Thus, it deprives appellant of her right to a jury trial on the issue of the truth or falsity of her speech. Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Gleisner, 202 Pa. 386, 388 , 51 A. 1024 (1902). See also Kidd v. Horry, 28 F. 773 (C.C.Pa.1886). The right to trial by jury is more than mere form. Indeed the right to a jury trial is guaranteed by this Commonwealth’s Constitution. Pa.Const. Art. I, § 6.
Furthermore, despite this Court’s traditional practice of avoiding constitutional questions where a non-constitutional ground is dispositive, Mt. Lebanon v. County Board of Elections, 470 Pa. 317, 322 , 368 A.2d 648, 650 (1977), it is appropriate in this case to reaffirm expressly the settled law governing the first amendment issue before us. The injunc *385 tion in this case is a classic example of a prior restraint on speech. Protection of the citizenry from prior restraints is one of the leading principles on which the first amendment is based. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 , 58 S.Ct. 666 , 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938). See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 , 51 S.Ct. 625 , 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). Thus, there is a heavy presumption against the constitutional validity of any prior restraint on speech. New York Times Company v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 , 91 S.Ct. 2140, 2141 , 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 , 91 S.Ct. 1575, 1578 , 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 , 89 S.Ct. 347, 351 , 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968).
In Organization for a Better Austin, supra, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an injunction restraining members of a citizen group from leafletting and picketing outside a real estate broker’s home. In doing so the Court stated:
“Respondent thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint. He has not met that burden. No prior decisions support the claim that the interest of an individual in being free from public criticism of his business practices in pamphlets or leaflets warrants use of the injunctive power of a court.”
Id., 402 U.S. at 419 , 91 S.Ct. at 1578. That rationale is equally applicable here. Appellees’ interest in protecting their reputations is insufficient to justify enjoining appellant’s speech, particularly where there is a legal remedy available. Thus, under the first amendment and the Supreme Court cases involving prior restraints, no basis exists for permitting the injunction in this case to stand.
Moreover, sound jurisprudential considerations dictate that we interpret Article I, § 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, at a minimum, to meet the established standard under the first amendment. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 , 87 S.Ct. 1627 , 18 L.Ed.2d 830 (1967) (California constitutional provision struck down as inconsistent with the *386 fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution). Our constitutional provision, too, is based upon an abhorrence of prior restraints.
For the above reasons, I concur in the result reached by the opinion of Mr. Justice Manderino.
O’BRIEN, J., joins in this concurring opinion.