explaining how basic gist of Justice Black’s concurrence in Grunewald motivated full Court in Griffin
How later courts described this case
- explaining how basic gist of Justice Black’s concurrence in Grunewald motivated full Court in Griffin
- an accused attorney’s constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated when the attorney’s prior claim of the privilege was introduced to impeach his credibility
- "It is elementary that a prior statement may be used to impeach a witness’ credibility only if that statement is in fact inconsistent with the witness’ testimony at trial.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
POMEROY, Justice
(dissenting).
I join the opinion of the Chief Justice, and add this separate opinion primarily to emphasize that our powers of de novo review under the Act of May 19, 1879, P.L. 66, § 1, 17 P.S. § 1663, permit us to disregard any error committed by the court below in admitting testimony that appellants. Oxman and Levitan had invoked their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination at a prior stage of the disciplinary proceeding. Even if nothing in this statute prevents us from remanding a case to the trial court in appropriate .circumstances, this course is not justified in the present case. There is abundant evidence in the record that appellants have engaged in unethical conduct. Moreover, nothing in the careful review of this evidence in the opinion of the court en banc below suggests that the court gave any weight whatever to this controverted testimony in making its findings; indeed, the claim of privilege is not so much as mentioned. Moreover, I find it hard to understand how remanding this case for retrial can guarantee a more impartial review of the evidence, for copies of the majority opinion will of course be read by the judges who will constitute the new disciplinary court, and presumably by common pleas judges throughout the Commonwealth. Thus we will have the anomaly that when this case is retried, no “factfinder . . . untainted by the unconstitutionally-elicited impeachment” * will be available. *127 In my view, a second trial of this case will be a costly and time-consuming exercise in futility.
JONES, C. J., joins in this dissenting opinion.
Majority opinion, supra, n. 7.