stating layered claim of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness relates back to actions of trial counsel, so that three-prong test for trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, if satisfied, supplies arguable merit prong of claim of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness; as appellant has failed to establish ineffectiveness of trial counsel, this necessarily defeats his claim of appellate counsel ineffectiveness
How later courts described this case
- stating layered claim of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness relates back to actions of trial counsel, so that three-prong test for trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, if satisfied, supplies arguable merit prong of claim of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness; as appellant has failed to establish ineffectiveness of trial counsel, this necessarily defeats his claim of appellate counsel ineffectiveness
- recognizing that although antagonistic defenses are a factor in determining prejudice, “the fact that defendants have conflicting versions of what took place, or the extent to which they participated in it, is a reason for rather than against a joint trial because the truth may be more easily determined if all are tried together.” (citations, footnote, and quotation marks omitted)
- stating that “[i]f it is clear that [a]ppellant has not demonstrated that counsel’s act or omission adversely affected the outcome of the proceedings, the claim may be dismissed on that basis alone[.]”
- requiring a defendant advancing a defense of diminished capacity based on mental defect to “establish [that he or she] had a mental defect at the time of [the] murder that affected his [or her] cognitive abilities of deliberation and premeditation necessary to formulate specific intent to kill.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice EAKIN,
concurring and dissenting.
I join the majority opinion, with the exception of Section V(C), which remands to the PCRA court for testimony about trial counsel’s consideration of Appellant’s potential mental health problem. Majority Op., at 107-10, 928 A.2d at 239-41.
As the majority indicates, this Court’s standard of review after the denial of PCRA relief is limited to determining whether the PCRA court’s ruling is supported by the record and free of legal error. Id., at 80-81, 928 A.2d at 223; see also Commonwealth v. Jones, 583 Pa. 130 , 876 A.2d 380, 384 (2005). The PCRA court reviewed Appellant’s claim he had a mental health problem and determined “[Appellant’s] affidavits from friends and family members alleging [he] suffered mental problems do not establish mitigation. The allegations contained in these affidavits are of questionable accuracy and are without medical corroboration.” PCRA Court Opinion, 7/26/04, at 10. The PCRA court concluded Appellant failed “to show how testimony to this effect would have swayed the jury to impose a different sentence.” Id. This conclusion is supported by the record. Likewise, I find no legal error. Accordingly, under our well defined standard of review, the order below should be affirmed. I see no reason why the PCRA court should receive testimony about trial counsel’s investigation when the PCRA court has justifiably determined there is no merit to the alleged mitigating mental health issue in the first place. Under our limited standard of review, I would affirm the PCRA court.