explaining that the abuse of discretion standard applies in the context of a Frye ruling, and “[a]n abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous” (citing Paden v. Baker Concrete Constr. Inc., 540 Pa. 409, 412, 658 A.2d 341, 343 (1995))
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the abuse of discretion standard applies in the context of a Frye ruling, and “[a]n abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous” (citing Paden v. Baker Concrete Constr. Inc., 540 Pa. 409, 412, 658 A.2d 341, 343 (1995))
- explaining that “‘[njormal’ does not mean ‘nothing' happened’ ” and that “[n]ormal findings are the rule, not the exception, in victims of child sexual ‘abuse, with or without penetration”
- noting that “[o]ne of the primary reasons” for deferring to professional judgments concerning methodology is “its assurance that judges would be guided by scientists when assessing the reliability of a scientific method” and that the rationale applies with greater force over time due to “the ever-increasing complexity of scientific advances”
- clarifying that, while the proponent must prove the general acceptance in the relevant scientific community of the methodology used, the proponent need not also prove "that the scientific community has also generally accepted the expert's conclusion"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
Concerning the Frye/Daubert debate, I take the position that the Frye rule is and remains the law of the Commonwealth, unless and until informed advocacy is presented that would favor a new direction, with due reference to the substantial body of information that has developed concerning the experience of the federal courts and others under Daubert.
With regard to the substantive analysis under Frye, I am not certain that I would frame the relevant inquiry as narrowly as does the majority. See Majority Opinion, Op. at 1047 (stating the controlling question as whether Dr. Beroes’ calculations are “a generally accepted method that scientists in the relevant field (or fields) use for reaching a conclusion as to whether Doritos remain too hard and too sharp as they are chewed and swallowed to be eaten safely.”). Indeed, taken to an extreme, such a formulation could be read to suggest that a plaintiff in these circumstances would need to identify a scientific community centered on Doritos chewing. In the abstract, I see no reason why properly grounded and confined opinions of a chemical engineer could not be offered in conjunction with the opinion of a physician in a case predicated on *571 non-obvious and undisclosed propensities arising from the compressive strength of foodstuff. 1
Here, however, as reflected in the trial court’s determination, Dr. Beroes’ opinions were neither properly grounded nor confined. In the first instance, in his report, he attempted to incorporate physiological principles (for example, the makeup and functioning of the esophagus) in order to speak directly to the ultimate issues in the case and, thus, offered opinions beyond the range of his expertise. Concerning the portion of his report centered on the physical properties of Doritos, I believe that a plaintiff who is going to rely on a relatively uncontrolled study involving a single researcher placing chips in his mouth with only a measure of time to reflect the degree of exposure to saliva, and with no attempt to account for other relevant factors such as the effect of mastication, is going to have a difficult time convincing a court that such methodology is accepted by any category of scientists as appropriate to establish a conclusion to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty.
Therefore, I am more in line with the trial court’s conclusion that Dr. Beroes’ methodology represented faulty science, thus lacking in general acceptance, although I fully acknowledge that there is a dynamic to his assessment that comports with the common sense notion that it is necessary to properly chew hard foodstuffs prior to swallowing.
Thus, I concur in the result.
. Notably, Appellees sought to offer expert testimony from a physician, which the Superior Court determined should not have been excluded by the trial court under the Frye test; as the majority notes, such determination has not been included within the scope of this Court’s discretionary review.