explaining that the abuse of discretion standard applies in the context of a Frye ruling, and “[a]n abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous” (citing Paden v. Baker Concrete Constr. Inc., 540 Pa. 409, 412, 658 A.2d 341, 343 (1995))
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the abuse of discretion standard applies in the context of a Frye ruling, and “[a]n abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous” (citing Paden v. Baker Concrete Constr. Inc., 540 Pa. 409, 412, 658 A.2d 341, 343 (1995))
- explaining that “‘[njormal’ does not mean ‘nothing' happened’ ” and that “[n]ormal findings are the rule, not the exception, in victims of child sexual ‘abuse, with or without penetration”
- noting that “[o]ne of the primary reasons” for deferring to professional judgments concerning methodology is “its assurance that judges would be guided by scientists when assessing the reliability of a scientific method” and that the rationale applies with greater force over time due to “the ever-increasing complexity of scientific advances”
- clarifying that, while the proponent must prove the general acceptance in the relevant scientific community of the methodology used, the proponent need not also prove "that the scientific community has also generally accepted the expert's conclusion"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice CASTILLE,
concurring.
Because the Majority Opinion is consistent with the position I outlined in my dissenting opinion in Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 564 Pa. 3 , 764 A.2d 1 (2000), I join.
In that dissenting opinion, I made three basic points. First, I noted that the test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), and adopted by this Court in Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223 , 369 A.2d 1277, 1281 (1977), “should remain the general evidentiary standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in this Commonwealth.” Blum, 764 A.2d at 6 (Castille, J. dissenting). Second, I noted that I would have explicitly disapproved of the Commonwealth Court’s novel opinion in McKenzie v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 674 A.2d 1167 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996), allocatur denied, 547 Pa. 733 , 689 A.2d 237 (1997), which “would require that a scientific expert’s opinion as to the causal relationship at issue, and not just the expert’s methodology, must find general acceptance in the relevant scientific community before it may even be heard.” Id. at 7, 9, 764 A.2d 1 (emphasis original). In my view, the general acceptance test is confined to the methodology at issue. Today’s Majority Opinion embraces both of these points.
The third point was that proper application of the Frye “general acceptance” test may require some flexibility in examining the relevant scientific community and the legitimacy of the scientific “consensus” which is invoked in an attempt to exclude the minority views of otherwise-qualified experts. As was readily demonstrated in Blum , there is a need for a limited exception to the Frye rule when, as in a case such as *563 Blum , there was evidence to show that the scientific orthodoxy that was invoked to exclude minority views was “a result of proprietary research influenced by an interested party.” My Dissenting Opinion elaborated upon that concern as follows:
[T]he record here shows that [the defendant drug manufacturer] largely created the “generally accepted orthodoxy” that would freeze out viewpoints contrary to [its] litigation interests. [The manufacturer] subsidized or otherwise influenced most of the studies that concluded that [its drug] does not cause birth defects. [The manufacturer’s] role in virtually creating, and then slanting, the “scientific community” should be a relevant factor in the Frye analysis. Accordingly, I would create a limited exception to Frye that would permit the introduction of expert opinions contrary to those opinions generally held by the “scientific community,” when those opinions are a result of proprietary research influenced by an interested party.
There is something not a little offensive about an entity creating a biased, litigation-driven scientific “orthodoxy,” and then being permitted to silence any qualified expert holding a dissenting view on grounds of “unorthodoxy.” Where the would-be relevant scientific community is a community beholden to the defendants’ litigation interests, that biased community should not be permitted to squelch dissenting opposing opinions. The trial court here properly refused to allow that unjust result to occur.
Id. at 16-17, 764 A.2d 1 . The brief Majority Opinion in Blum entirely failed to address this concern, notwithstanding its prominent role in the reasoning of the Blum trial judge.
The Court today understandably does not discuss this proprietary interest scenario because it is not at issue. I write on the point only to note that I continue to believe what I expressed in Blum and that nothing in today’s Majority Opinion operates to preclude the analysis set forth in my Dissent in the next case properly presenting the issue.
*564 Subject to the above qualification, I join the Majority Opinion.