Opinion

Commonwealth v. Gibson

  • 271 Pa. Super. 499
  • 414 A.2d 364
  • 1979 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3231
Court
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Nov 9, 1979
Status
Published
Author
Manderino
On the bench
Watkins, Manderino and Cirillo
Cited by
7 cases
Authority
More cited than 7.4%

where defense counsel was aware at suppression hearing that only eyewitnesses to crime initially failed to identify defendant, no merit to contention that Commonwealth withheld evidence

How later courts described this case

  • where defense counsel was aware at suppression hearing that only eyewitnesses to crime initially failed to identify defendant, no merit to contention that Commonwealth withheld evidence
  • where defense became aware at suppression hearing that the only eyewitness initially had failed to identify defendant, no merit to contention Commonwealth withheld the evidence

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

MANDERINO, Judge,

dissenting:

I dissent. The majority concludes that the evidence of the defendant’s possible bigamous conduct was admissible to show that the defendant had a motive to commit the crime. I cannot agree. Motive was established by the testimony that Iris Dymond had broken off her relationship with the defendant and ordered him out of the house. The bigamous conduct concerns her motive — not the defendant’s — for breaking off the relationship. When facts are introduced to establish motive, the door is not open to show prior misconduct except to the extent necessary to establish the motive. Commonwealth v. Stanley, 484 Pa. 2 , 398 A.2d 631 (1979); Commonwealth v. Fuller, 479 Pa. 353 , 388 A.2d 693 (1978); Commonwealth v. Foose, 441 Pa. 173 , 272 A.2d 452 (1971). Other facts which, as in this case, were highly prejudicial should not be admitted. Commonwealth v. Stanley, supra; Commonwealth v. Fuller, supra; Commonwealth v. Foose, supra.

In this case, the prosecution was entitled to establish that Iris Dymond had broken off her relationship with the de *504 fendant and ordered him out of the apartment where the two of them had been living. It may even have been harmless had the testimony been limited to establishing that she did so because he was a married man. To allow further unnecessary evidence, however, which does not go to the defendant’s motive, concerning bigamy was prejudicial error. This “bad person” irrelevant evidence could well have influenced the jury in arriving at its verdict.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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