The opinion
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
MORRISON, Judge.
We have now been furnished with a statement of facts which was filed with the trial court in ample time.
We shall proceed to examine Bill of Exception No. 1 in the light of appellant’s contentions.
This being a misdemeanor, the appellant and her husband were properly jointly charged as principals. From the evidence, it is shown that Officer Yeager went to the home of the appellant and her husband, rang the bell at the door, and a lady’s voice said, “Come in”; that he then found himself facing a one-way mirror; that a lady’s voice said, “What can we do for you, sir?” to which he replied, “I would like a pint of Bourbon DeLuxe, please”; that the lady’s voice then asked him his name and for whom he worked. At that moment a man’s voice spoke up and said, “That is all right,” and the woman said, “Drop $4.00 in the slot, please.” Yeager placed a $10.00 bill in the slot, and a few moments later the whiskey and his change were delivered to him through the slot. After this, Yeager walked out to his automobile, where he raised the hood and pretended to have trouble *337 “in order to give plenty of time for the other officers to get there with the search warrant.” The other officers came with the warrant, and all of them entered the house, where they found the appellant and her husband near the door. Other than these two, there was an old lady knitting in the back room and two children. Upon a search of the premises, no further whiskey was found, but the money which was paid for the whiskey was found in the pocket of appellant’s husband.
It was shown that the witness Yeager identified the voice of the appellant as that of the lady who talked to him concerning the whiskey and excluded the voices of the other adults present.
In Collins v. State, 77 Texas Cr. Rep. 156 , 178 S.W. 345, 355 , this court quoted with approval from Encyclopedia of Evidence as follows:
“Voice is a competent means of identification if the witness had any previous acquaintance with the person identified. It is sufficient that the witness has heard such person’s voice but once previous to the time in question.”
In Massey v. State, 266 S.W. 2d 880 , (page 49, this volume) we said:
“Whether he heard the voice for the first time in the telephone conversation or in personal contact is immaterial. The personal contact which becomes the basis for identification of a telephone voice may be subsequent as well as prior to the telephone conversation.”
In Huskey v. State, 159 Texas Cr. Rep. 557 , 266 S.W. 2d 168 , we affirmed a conviction based upon a one-way mirror transaction such as we have before us here, but in that case the money which passed through the door was not recovered, as it was in the case at bar.
Remaining convinced that we properly disposed of this case originally, the appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled. No further motions for rehearing will be entertained.