The Court in Martin “observed that prior decisions of this Court which had iterated exacting ‘requisites’ for establishing a knowing waiver of counsel, [e.g., Barbour v. State, 551 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Cr[im].App. 1977); Goodman v. State, 591 S.W.2d 498 (Tex.Cr[im].App. 1980); and Geeslin v. State, 600 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Cr[im].App. 1980)], had read Faretta incorrectly.”
How later courts described this case
- The Court in Martin “observed that prior decisions of this Court which had iterated exacting ‘requisites’ for establishing a knowing waiver of counsel, [e.g., Barbour v. State, 551 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Cr[im].App. 1977); Goodman v. State, 591 S.W.2d 498 (Tex.Cr[im].App. 1980); and Geeslin v. State, 600 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Cr[im].App. 1980)], had read Faretta incorrectly.”
- noting the rules of appellate procedure “do not authorize review of claims which have not been presented in an orderly fashion and determined by the appropriate court of appeals”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MILLER, Judge,
dissenting.
I am somewhat surprised the author of the majority opinion does not analyze the ease under the rationale of the majority opinion in Blankenship v. State, 673 S.W.2d 578 (Tex.Cr.App.1984).
For its failure to do so and for the reasons in Judge Teague’s opinion, I dissent.