holding that interests in uniformity are not determinative in a choice-of-law analysis, when another jurisdiction has “a significantly greater interest” in adjudication of the matter
How later courts described this case
- holding that interests in uniformity are not determinative in a choice-of-law analysis, when another jurisdiction has “a significantly greater interest” in adjudication of the matter
- applying the Maryland child support guideline where the children resided in Maryland, notwithstanding the more generous provisions of the District of Columbia guideline, and in spite of the fact that the litigation was instituted in the District
- recognizing precedent which suggests that court should apply law of children’s domicile
- “Our obligation under M.A.P. v. Ryan to follow otherwise binding precedents does not evaporate because a party has failed to cite them to us.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FARRELL, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I join Judge SCHWELB’S opinion unqual-ifiedly. As Judge FERREN concedes in *326 dissent, there is no “indication” in either statute or case law that Maryland, in applying its child support guideline, would turn a blind eye to that “rare” case, post at 332, not exemplified here, in which the noncustodial parent experienced a dramatic increase in his/her standard of living. We should not decide this ease on the bare hypothetical possibility of such an outcome. Without a more persuasive demonstration of likely difference in the application of the two guidelines, Judge Schwelb is correct that “the most important reality in this case,” in a balancing of governmental interests, is that the children are domiciled in Maryland, where their primary expenses are incurred.