determining that the designation “sexually violent predator” is “separate and distinct from both the trial and sentencing and entails a fact-finding function” that demands a high standard of proof
How later courts described this case
- determining that the designation “sexually violent predator” is “separate and distinct from both the trial and sentencing and entails a fact-finding function” that demands a high standard of proof
- recognizing distinction between challenge to registration provision under Megan’s Law I in Mountain and challenge resulting from SVP designation under Megan’s Law I
- finding insufficient evidence where appellant engaged in sexual abuse of child while visiting home but was not in role of caretaker and had no duty to protect child
- finding that Megan’s Law violated procedural due process
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Bryant, 2012 Pa. Super. 257 (2012)
However, Halye is distinguishable.
The opinion
ORIE MELVIN, Judge,
concurring:
While I join this en banc opinion, I write separately to express my belief that despite the procedural due process infirmity of § 9794 of Title 42 the purpose of such a law remains a laudable and achievable goal which should not be discarded nor its implementation abandoned. I would therefore encourage our General Assembly to act expeditiously in making revisions that will comport with the constitutional mandates expressed in the majority opinion.
While not addressed by the majority, it is noteworthy to mention that similar legislation has withstood constitutional scrutiny by *778 the United States Supreme Court on substantive due process, double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). Unlike our law, the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act 1 places the burden of proof upon the State and was therefore not assailable on procedural due process grounds. Moreover, the Kansas Act provides an alternative method for dealing with violent sexual predators. Rather than increasing an offender’s maximum term of imprisonment or imposing a mandatory life sentence the Kansas law establishes a procedure for the civil commitment of such persons. As outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks, supra,
the Act’s civil commitment procedures pertain[s] to: (1) a presently confined person who ‘has been convicted of a sexually violent offense’ and is scheduled for release; (2) a person who has been ‘charged with a sexually violent offense’ but has been found incompetent to stand trial; (3) a person who has been found ‘not guilty by reason of insanity of a sexually violent offense’; and (4) a person found ‘not guilty’ of a sexually violent offense because of a mental disease or defect.
Id, 117 S.Ct. at 2077 .
When a petition seeking civil commitment is filed under the Kansas Act, the court must first determine whether “probable cause” exists to support a finding that the person is a “sexually violent predator” and thus eligible for civil commitment. If such a determination is made then the individual is transferred to a facility for professional evaluation. § 59-29a05. Following the evaluation, a trial would be held to determine whether the individual was a sexually violent predator with the proof being beyond a reasonable doubt. If found to be a predator, the person is transferred to the custody of the Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services for “control, care and treatment until such time as the person’s mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that the person is safe to be at large.” § 59-29a07(a). Therefore I believe, in addition to the criminal sanctions provided by the instant legislation, our Commonwealth would be well-served by a closer examination into the viability of a civil commitment alternative.
. Kan. Stat. Ann. 59-29a01 to 59-29al5 (1994 & Supp.1996).