social worker’s testimony that child’s behavior “consistent with abuse” was reversible error
How later courts described this case
- social worker’s testimony that child’s behavior “consistent with abuse” was reversible error
- admission of twenty-two-year-old conviction held reversible error
- use of CSAAS to prove abuse and child’s subsequent behavior
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Stringer v. Commonwealth, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 149 (1997)
In Brown v. Commonwealth, we held that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting a twenty-two (22) year old prior conviction for storehouse breaking. 812 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Ky.1991), overruled on other grounds by Stringer v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883 (Ky.1997).
The opinion
WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I would respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion which reverses the conviction.
It would appear that the majority establishes a new rule by judicial mandate that any conviction more than 10 years old is inadmissible because of remoteness. I believe that such an automatic fixed rule is in contradiction to the philosophy expressed in Commonwealth v. Richardson, Ky., 674 S.W.2d 515 (1984). Richardson, supra, provided a balanced approach to the definition of remoteness when it noted that other pertinent factors in addition to time may be considered. The circumstances of each case should determine the application of prior convictions in regard to a remoteness consideration. The status of Scruggs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 566 S.W.2d 405 (1978) and Hunter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 560 S.W.2d 808 (1977) seem to be unclear. If the court wishes to establish a new definite time standard then such a rule should be promulgated in a prospective fashion.
The trial judge did not commit reversible error in admitting testimony of factors which would be consistent with abuse. In this case, Brown seeks to explain the behavior of the victim as that of a disturbed child or a born liar. There was no reversible error in permitting evidence to the contrary whether it was in anticipation or in response to such a theory. Onwan v. Commonwealth, supra, presents a common sense approach to this difficult subject.
The trial judge did not commit reversible error in permitting the medical witness to consider the case history relative to her medical findings. The doctor examined the prosecuting witness in the emergency room and noted a significant but old healed cervical tear. The expression of these facts involved medical testimony only and do not go to the ultimate issue which is always reserved to the jury.
I would affirm the conviction in all respects.