examining statute requiring wrongful-death action “shall be brought within one year of death, and not thereafter” and finding the requirement that a wrongful death action be brought within one year after a “definitely established event, — ‘death’—leaves no room for construction”
How later courts described this case
- examining statute requiring wrongful-death action “shall be brought within one year of death, and not thereafter” and finding the requirement that a wrongful death action be brought within one year after a “definitely established event, — ‘death’—leaves no room for construction”
- discovery rule does not apply to wrongful death statute which provided that a cause of action "shall be brought within one year after the death, and not thereafter" (italics ours) since the Legislature intended death, and not discovery, to be the time at which the cause of action accrues
- plurality opinion, authored by Mr. Justice Wilkinson and joined in by Messrs. Justice Roberts and Flaherty, with Messrs. Justice Larsen and Kauffman concurring in the result
- "Appellants, of course, argue that the discovery rule is inapplicable and that the statutory periods began to run, at the latest, on the dates of the decedents' deaths. We agree."
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by McGOWAN v. UNIVERSITY OF SCRANTON, 759 F.2d 287 (1985)
Cf. Anthony, 496 Pa. at 122, 436 A.2d at 183 ("Appellants, of course, argue that the discovery rule is inapplicable and that the statutory periods began to run, at the latest, on the dates of the decedents' deaths.
Distinguished by McGowan v. University of Scranton, 759 F.2d 287 (1985)
Cf. Anthony, 496 Pa. at 122, 436 A.2d at 183 (“Appellants, of course, argue that the discovery rule is inapplicable and that the statutory periods began to run, at the latest, on the dates of the decedents’ deaths.
Distinguished by Gravinese v. Johns-Manville Corp., 324 Pa. Super. 432 (1984)
496 Pa. 119, 436 A.2d 181 (1981), the Supreme Court held that the “discovery rule” was inapplicable to wrongful death and survival actions.
The opinion
*126 O’BRIEN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The majority’s reliance upon the rules of statutory construction in summarily refusing to extend the applicability of the “discovery rule” to the instant wrongful death and survival actions is misplaced. As Judge Spaeth made clear in the cogent and well-considered Superior Court decision,
“application of the discovery rule is not based upon any specific wording in the particular statute of limitations in question. Instead, application of the rule has been based upon the recognition that if a party, despite the exercise of diligence, cannot ascertain his injury, the statute of limitations should not run against his claim. In short, the discovery rule is a judicial creation; fashioned to solve a specific problem, namely, whether the law should preclude recovery for an injury that not even a diligent party may reasonably be expected to discover.”
Anthony v. Koppers Co., Inc., 284 Pa.Super. 81, 89 , 425 A.2d 428, 432 (1980) (emphasis in original).
The discovery rule, therefore, is best seen as a judicial response to the anomalies which inevitably result from the wooden application of statutes of limitations. This solution has heretofore found favor in this Court’s decisions, and there is a recognized trend toward widening its applicability. See Anthony v. Koppers Co., Inc., supra, 284 Pa.Super. at 95 , 425 A.2d at 434 -435 and cases cited therein. Suddenly, however, the majority chooses to declare in effect that the statutes of limitations relevant to the instant actions run in a vacuum, impervious to the considerations which would accompany the decision whether or not to invoke the discovery rule. Moreover, the fact that the rule has been embraced by the courts of this Commonwealth demonstrates that there must be more to deciding such cases than merely construing the relevant statutes of limitations.
On a sheerly practical level, the majority’s newly announced principle is likely to encourage the commencement of a rash of law suits filed to protect potential causes of action which are not yet and may never become meritorious. *127 The potential increase in litigation under an extended discovery rule pales by comparison.
I would affirm.