Opinion

Ex Parte Matthews

  • 933 S.W.2d 134
  • 1996 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 216
  • 1996 WL 604183
Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Filed
Oct 23, 1996
Status
Published
Author
White
On the bench
Clinton, Baird, White
Cited by
46 cases
Authority
More cited than 7.4%

Overruled on other grounds by Proctor v. State, 1998 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 33 (1998)

stating, in dicta, that based on articles 12.01, 12.02, and 12.03, aggravated perjury has a 2 two-year statute of limitations due to article 12.03(d) specifying that “an offense titled ‘aggravated’ carries the same period as primary crime

How later courts described this case

  • stating, in dicta, that based on articles 12.01, 12.02, and 12.03, aggravated perjury has a 2 two-year statute of limitations due to article 12.03(d) specifying that “an offense titled ‘aggravated’ carries the same period as primary crime
  • holding that one is not an accused unless charged with the offense and a person does not become an accused for purposes of art. 12.05 tolling until the person has been charged with the offense
  • stating that the statute 24 of limitations for aggravated perjury is two years pursuant to Article 12.03(d) because perjury is the primary crime, which is a misdemeanor
  • "[T]hat prosecutorial authorities exercise all due diligence obtaining and presenting a formal accusation of an offense against a person."

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Overruled on other grounds by Proctor v. State, 1998 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 33 (1998)

    933 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Proctor v. State, 967 S.W.2d 840
    Court of Criminal Appeals of TexasMar 11, 199827 citing opinionsother groundsRead it
  • Overruled on other grounds by Ex Parte Welch, 1998 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 139 (1998)

    Proc. arts. 12.01, 12.03(d); Ex parte Matthews, 933 S.W.2d 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), overruled on other grounds by Proctor v. State, 967 S.W.2d 840 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). . See Ex parte Welch, 981 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) ("[T]o be reasonably likely to render effective assistance to his client, a lawyer must be sufficiently abreast of developments in criminal law aspects implicated in the case at hand.”).
    Court of Criminal Appeals of TexasOct 28, 1998other groundsmedium confidenceRead it

The opinion

WHITE, Judge,

dissenting.

In its opinion on remand, the Court of Appeals decided that the tolling provisions of TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 12.05(a) do not apply to persons who have absented themselves from this State until they have been formally accused of committing a crime. *141 Ex parte Matthews, 892 S.W.2d 208, at 211 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1995). The State petitioned us to review whether the Court of Appeals erred when it construed Art. 12.05(a). The majority has decided to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. I dissent.

In her dissenting opinion, Justice Oliver-Parrot stated

“The appellant is the criminal defendant and the one accused. The language of the statute 1 refers to the person who is now the “accused.” There is nothing to suggest that the accused had to be charged before leaving the state. The appellant allegedly committed a crime and left the state. We should hold the tolling statute applies once a person commits a crime and leaves the state. Although it does not appear the appellant left the state to avoid detection, we should be compelled to apply the tolling statute.”

Ex parte Matthews, 892 S.W.2d, at 212 .

The Code Construction Act points out that “words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” See TEX. GOVT.CODE ANN. § 311.011(a). As Justice Oliver-Parrot pointed out, the word “accused” means only “a criminal defendant, the person who now stands charged by indictment or information.” Ex parte Matthews, 892 S.W.2d, at 212 ; Oliver-Parrot, J., dissenting. Art. 12.05(a) does not state the person must be accused before they leave or flee. “It is not for the courts to add or subtract from such a statute.” Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, at 785 (Tex.Cr.App.1991); citing Coit v. State, 808 S.W.2d 473, at 475 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). The decision of the majority opinion below that an individual must attain the status of being an accused prior to the time they have left, or fled from, the State, is an attempt to write something into the text of Art. 12.05(a) that was not there when the Legislature finished drafting the statute.

The lower court decision which the majority lets stand interprets Art. 12.05(a) so the statute does not include people who commit crimes and flee from, or leave, the State before an investigation and formal charges have caught up to them. So long as that individual remains beyond the reach of the local authorities in another state or country, the statute of limitations for their crimes will not have been tolled and will continue to run while they remain uncharged.

Therefore, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s decision to affirm the decision of the First Court of Appeals.

. Art. 12.05(a) reads as follows:

"The time during which the accused is absent from the state shall not he computed in the period of limitation.”

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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