finding that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of prior assaults “unless linked to ‘the relevant time period’” because such evidence “was clearly admissible to show bias and motive to fabricate” and case law 29 supported the idea that even prior incidents “many years ago” are not “so remote in time to be irrelevant to the parties’ relationship”
How later courts described this case
- finding that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of prior assaults “unless linked to ‘the relevant time period’” because such evidence “was clearly admissible to show bias and motive to fabricate” and case law 29 supported the idea that even prior incidents “many years ago” are not “so remote in time to be irrelevant to the parties’ relationship”
- holding that evidence of past beatings allegedly administered by decedent’s boyfriend was im-properly excluded in defendant’s murder prosecution
- holding it was error not to instruct jury on independent cause of death that would have exonerated defendant of murder
- error not to allow defense to offer evidence of a third party’s prior assaults on the victim where the third party had been alone with the victim shortly before her death and the victim may have acquired a new bruise during that time
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MACK, Associate Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that appellant Robert Stack’s manslaughter conviction must be reversed because he has been deprived both of his constitutional right to confront a key witness and of his right to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case. However, I find the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury, as well as the rationale employed to reach that result, to be extremely troubling.
The majority, noting the government’s concession that the medical evidence, standing alone, was insufficient to convict appellant for manslaughter, concludes that without James Vaughan’s testimony the evidence would have been insufficient. In reversing appellant’s conviction because of the court’s limitation on cross-examination, the majority has concluded that Vaughan was a crucial witness whose testimony went to the heart of the defense theory that some intervening cause, not the action of appellant, had caused the death of the victim. The basic reason why reversal is mandated in such a ease is that curtailment of cross-examination has prevented the jury from receiving information essential to an assessment of the credibility of the government witness — here, “a key witness ... [whose] testimony establishes a required element of the charged offense....” Lawrence v. United States, 482 A.2d 374, 377 (D.C.1984) (quoting Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 855 (D.C.1978)).
I think it therefore an anomaly for the majority to reverse because the jury was prevented from assessing the credibility of testimony essential to the conviction, while simultaneously concluding, as the basis of its holding that the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury, that the same testimony can be used to supply the essential element needed to convict. The majority concedes that there are no cases explicitly addressing the right to confront adverse witnesses in the context of evidentiary sufficiency; the cases it does cite do not support the proposition that, where there has been reversible error by the trial court in curtailing cross-examination, the appropriate remedy is that of a remand for retrial. 1 See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, — U.S. -, *162 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1438 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (no sufficiency issue raised; remand by the United States Supreme Court to the Delaware Supreme Court for the sole purpose of determining whether the error in limiting cross-examination was harmless); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320-21 , 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1112-13 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (no sufficiency issue raised); Lawrence v. United States, supra, 482 A.2d at 378 (same); Goldman v. United States, 473 A.2d 852, 858 (D.C.1984) (same); Springer v. United States, supra, 388 A.2d at 857 (same); see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 106 S.Ct. at 1440 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“denial of cross-examination ... may deprive the defense of its best opportunity to expose genuine flaws in the prosecution’s case — flaws that the cold record will not reveal to an appellate court”).
Moreover, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that its approach makes sense in the framework of our judicial system. It does not make sense to me to say that testimony which has not been tested for the purpose of maintaining the “integrity of the fact-finding process,” majority opinion, supra p. 161, can provide the sufficiency necessary to send a case to the jury. It does not make sense to me to say that the government, after having pressed for and obtained an erroneous ruling preventing the jury from assessing the credibility of “crucial” testimony, is nevertheless permitted to rely on that testimony and is not held accountable for its failure to produce other evidence essential to support its case.
I would reverse. I would not remand.
. Retrial is constitutionally forbidden where the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 , 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2150 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). This is so because the Double Jeopardy Clause mandates that "No person shall ... be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const, amend. V.