The opinion
BROOKSHIRE, Justice,
concurring.
I wish to add a short concurrence to the Court’s opinion and stress only a few cogent, pertinent points.
I concur that the terminology “drug impact” is no more prejudicial than the words “criminal district court”. The record simply fails to reflect that the name of the court violates the appellant’s right to an impartial jury. Neither does the name of the court standing alone demonstrate that the appellant’s presumption of innocence has been violated or diminished to any degree.
Appellant contends also that his conviction should be reversed because the evidence is lacking in that no affirmative link was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant argues that no affirmative link is properly proved to meet the prosecution’s burden of proof that the appellant had the custody, control and management and possession of the athletic bag in question which contained contraband.
By citing Foster v. State, 814 S.W.2d 874 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1991, pet. ref’d) and Whitworth v. State, 808 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.App.—Austin 1991, pet. ref’d), appellant places major reliance on Humason v. State, 728 S.W.2d 363 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). In Humason , possession of contraband was demonstrated by circumstantial evidence. Appellant is correct to state that the prosecution is obliged to prove that the appellant exercised care, control and management over the substance involved and that he knew that the substance was contraband.
Of course, the prosecution must provide proof that the appellant intentionally and knowingly exercised custody, control and management to satisfy the mens rea requirement. And in Humason , the appellant is correct that the court wrote that for cases involving circumstantial evidence there was an additional principle of appellate review which was applicable. The additional principle or concept was that a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence cannot be sustained if the circumstances do not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of the guilt of the defendant. This concept implicated an analytical construct standard. See Moore v. State, 640 S.W.2d 300 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). It follows, of course, that if the evidence merely amounts to a strong suspicion or a mere probability then the burden of proof has not been met by the prosecution. But the ultimate standard is laid down in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
In Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim.App.1991), the Court of Criminal Appeals found that the analytical construct was no longer valid in view of that court’s earlier decision to abrogate the circumstantial evidence instruction or charge, citing Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim.App.1983) (Opinion on Rehearing). Geesa reads at 155:
[A]nd (2) that a definitional instruction on “reasonable doubt” is required in light of our decision to abandon the analytical construct.
*888 This rule applies to cases tried after November 6, 1991. June 29, 1992, is the trial date of this case. The majority correctly views and considers the analytical construct in Humason, supra, to be obsolete. A landmark, current case is Criner v. State, No. 1212-91, 1992 WL 366939 (Tex.Crim.App. December 16, 1992).
In Geesa, Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 , 75 S.Ct. 127 , 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954), was cited with approval. Holland was a tax evasion case involving the net worth method of proof. In Holland, the federal Supreme Court held that where the trial court had charged the jury on the elements of the offense, the presumption of innocence, the prosecution’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt which encompassed a full definition of reasonable doubt, the length and the nature of the net worth method of proof and the character of circumstantial evidence in general; it was then not necessary for the trial court to add to the charge that because the proof was circumstantial, the government must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the defendant.
An accurate, relevant quote from Holland reads:
The Charge to the Jury.
Petitioners press upon us, finally, the contention that the instructions of the trial court were so erroneous and misleading as to constitute grounds for reversal. We have carefully reviewed the instructions and cannot agree. But some require comment. The petitioners assail the refusal of the trial judge to instruct that where the Government’s evidence is circumstantial it must be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt. There is some support for this type of instruction in the lower court decisions, Garst v. United States (CA 4th Va) 180 F 339, 343; Anderson v. United States (CA 5th Tex) 30 F2d 485-487; Stutz v. United States (CA 5th Fla) 47 F2d 1029, 1030; Hanson v. United States (CA 6th Ohio) 208 F2d 914, 916, but the better rule is that where the jury is properly instructed on the standards for reasonable doubt, such an additional instruction on circumstantial evidence is confusing and incorrect, United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp. (CA2d NY) 31 F2d 229, 234, cert den 279 US 863 , 73 L ed 1002, 49 S Ct 479 ; United States v. Becker (CA2d NY) 62 F2d 1007, 1010; 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed) §§ 25, 26.
Circumstantial evidence in this respect is intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence. Admittedly, circumstantial evidence may in some cases point to a wholly incorrect result. Yet this is equally true of testimonial evidence. In both instances, a jury is asked to weigh the chances that the evidence correctly points to guilt against the possibility of inaccuracy or ambiguous inference. In both, the jury must use its experience with people and events in weighing the probabilities. If the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, we can require no more.
In Geesa , the Court reasoned that their opinion properly found that there is but one standard of proof for criminal convictions and where the jury is properly instructed on that standard of proof, then a charge on circumstantial evidence is valueless and invites confusion. The constitutional, correct burden of proof in criminal cases is: “that the State establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt”. See Crocker v. State, 573 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (Opinion on Rehearing).
The Court’s opinion is outstanding in its logic in overruling points of error four and five. “Annex courts”, “impact courts” and “drug impact courts” are constitutional. These courts are valid. These types of courts were established properly and not in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the State of Texas. Zamora v. State, 508 S.W.2d 819 (Tex.Crim.App.1974); Reed v. State, 500 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.Crim.App.1973), overruled on other grounds 522 S.W.2d 479 (Tex.Crim.App.1974); Peach v. State, 498 S.W.2d 192 (Tex.Crim.App.1973).