concluding there was not a reasonable probability the result would have been different had trial counsel objected to erroneous definitions in abstract portion of the jury charge, where application paragraph focused the jury on the result of appellant’s conduct.
How later courts described this case
- concluding there was not a reasonable probability the result would have been different had trial counsel objected to erroneous definitions in abstract portion of the jury charge, where application paragraph focused the jury on the result of appellant’s conduct.
- concluding that overwhelming evidence and defense counsel’s arguments to the jury in closing argument were sufficient to render erroneous definitions of “intentionally” and “knowingly” not egregiously harmful
- declining to follow Mott and adopting Sneed
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DUGGAN, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the disposition of the case. However, contrary to the majority opinion, I subscribe to the reasoning of the Fourteenth Court of Appeals regarding proper definitions in an aggravated assault case, as was *302 dealt with in Mott v. State, 885 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. refd), and I reject the reasoning of the Dallas Court in Sneed v. State, 803 S.W.2d 833 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). I agree with Chief Justice Brown and the unanimous panel in Mott in their statement saying:
We are aware that the definitions in the Sneed ease are identical to the definitions in the instant case, and the Dallas Court of Appeals held those definitions erroneously focused on the “nature of the conduct.” See id. We disagree with that determination.
The Sneed opinion fails to address the language in the definitions dealing with the “result of the conduct.” The definitions allow the jury to convict appellant on a finding that he intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury to [the named complainant] when it was his conscious objective or desire to cause that result; or where he engaged in conduct when he was aware that his conduct was reasonably certain to cause bodily injury to James. The charge in this case also instructed the jury that appellant committed “an assault if he intentionally or knowingly cause[d] bodily injury to another.” The charge properly addresses the result of appellant’s conduct. ...
835 S.W.2d at 259.
With this distinction, I agree with the affir-mance of the judgment below.