explaining, for purposes of an aiding-and-abetting conviction, that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant actually knew that the principal crime took place where the assailants got out of the car driven by the defendant and committed the assault, then returned to the car, and the victim ran past the car with a “bloodied face” moments later
How later courts described this case
- explaining, for purposes of an aiding-and-abetting conviction, that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant actually knew that the principal crime took place where the assailants got out of the car driven by the defendant and committed the assault, then returned to the car, and the victim ran past the car with a “bloodied face” moments later
- a knowing association with the criminal venture and an intent to commit the crime
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FERREN, Associate Judge,
concurring:
According to the standard instruction which the court gave to the jury, “[a] person aids and abets another in the commission of a crime if he knowingly associates himself in some way with the criminal venture with the intent to commit the crime, participates in it as something he wishes to bring about, and seeks by some action of his to make it succeed.” Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 4.02 (3d ed. 1978). An aider and abettor is liable as a principal to the crime. See D.C. Code 1973, § 22-105. The weakest link in the government’s case charging appellant Jefferson with assault with intent to commit robbery while armed 1 — a specific intent crime — is the evidentiary basis for the subjective elements of aiding and abetting: Jefferson’s “knowing” association with the criminal venture and his “intent to commit the crime.”
I believe, however, that a reasonable jur- or could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Jefferson had the required knowledge and intent and was guilty as charged on the basis of evidence tending to show the following: (1) Although Jefferson apparently did not see the assault, he parked the Granada and watched his companions get out of the car and head toward the complaining witness; (2) after the assault, the complaining witness saw one of her assailants run up to the parked car Jefferson was driving and grab the door handle, as though to enter, before running down the alley; (3) the complaining witness passed by the car and saw Jefferson (whom she positively identified) at the wheel; and (4) the police picked up Jefferson and the other assailants in the same car approximately 20 minutes later.
Although this is a borderline case of circumstantial evidence of Jefferson’s knowledge and intent, I would not second-guess the jury here. 2
*413 NEWMAN, Chief Judge, dissenting:
The facts of this case with respect to appellant Jefferson are almost identical to those in Clark v. United States, D.C.App., 418 A.2d 1059 (1980), where we reverse the conviction on grounds of insufficient evidence. I am unpersuaded by the majority’s attempt to distinguish that case from the instant one, and dissent from the affirmance of Jefferson’s conviction.
. D.C. Code 1973, §§ 22-501, -3202.
. Arguably, the evidence warrants only an inference that Jefferson knew his colleagues were approaching the complaining witness for *413 some illegal purpose (e. g., purchase of narcotics), not necessarily the particular crime committed: assault with intent to commit robbery while armed. Even so, this would not necessarily mean that Jefferson could not be found guilty of aiding and abetting as charged:
Where a defendant aids and abets in the commission of one crime and other crimes are committed, it may be appropriate to instruct the jury that the defendant is liable for all crimes which (1) occurred in furtherance of the common design or plan to commit the crime which he aided or abetted or (2) were natural or probable consequences of the crime which he aided and abetted even though he was not the actual perpetrator of these other crimes or might not have intended them to occur. See United States v. Clay-borne, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 140 , 509 F.2d 473 (1974) and United States v. Heiniein, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 157 , 490 F.2d 725 (1973).
Criminal Jury Instructions No. 4.02, supra, Comment at 144.