holding that it was “unreasonable and arbitrary for the legislature to conclude that arbitrary damage caps, applicable to all claimants no matter how seriously injured, will help Dissenting Opinion by Justice PATTERSON. assure a rational relationship between actual damages and the amounts awarded.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that it was “unreasonable and arbitrary for the legislature to conclude that arbitrary damage caps, applicable to all claimants no matter how seriously injured, will help Dissenting Opinion by Justice PATTERSON. assure a rational relationship between actual damages and the amounts awarded.”
- holding that it was “simply unfair and unreasonable to impose the burden of supporting the medical care industry solely upon those persons who are most severely injured and therefore most in need of compensation.”
- recognizing medical negligence claim was common-law cause of action and damage cap restricted plaintiff’s right to redress on this common-law claim, so “the remaining inquiry is whether the restriction on [the plaintiffs’] right of recovery ‘is unreasonable or arbitrary when balanced against the purpose and basis of the statute’”
- recognizing medical negligence claim was common-law cause of action and damage cap restricted plaintiffs right to redress on this common-law claim, so “the remaining inquiry is whether the restriction on [the plaintiffs’] right of recovery ⅛ unreasonable or arbitrary when balanced against the purpose and basis of the statute’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CULVER, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the result reached by the majority. However, I do so with caution because I believe that legislative caps on medical malpractice awards could be consistent with the Texas Constitution under certain circumstances.
The damages limitations contained in Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4590i, §§ 11.02 and 11.03 would not unconstitutionally limit Lucas’ right of access to the courts for a “remedy by due course of law” if the legislature had seen fit to provide Lucas and those similarly situated with an alternative remedy. The majority notes that “in two of the jurisdictions in which damages caps were upheld, the fact that alternative remedies were provided weighed heavily in the decisions,” citing Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, 273 Ind. 374 , 404 N.E.2d 585, 601 (1980) and Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 462 So.2d 149, 156 (La.1985), modified on rek’g, 477 So.2d 1094, 1109-10 (La.1985) (latter opinion ordering conditional remand on state equal protection challenge). The majority observes that the state legislatures of Indiana and Louisiana had established “patient compensation funds.” The majority further observes that Dean Kee-ton urged that a victim’s compensation fund be established as a substitute for the damages caps in question here. I share the concern expressed by the majority that lack of alternative remedies renders these caps unreasonable and arbitrary when bal *702 anced against the purpose and basis of the statute.
I have chosen to express my views separately because I do not wish to be understood as saying that all damages caps are fundamentally unconstitutional. I do not interpret the majority opinion to stand for such a proposition, but to the extent the majority may be interpreted to so hold, I would disagree. In my view, damages caps could survive constitutional scrutiny if the statutory scheme provided an adequate alternative remedy, such as a patient compensation fund, for victims of catastrophic injuries.
SEPTEMBER 21, 1988