holding that where appellate court fairly evaluates relevant evidence using correct legal standards, that court’s judgment will not be reversed where sufficiently supported by evidence and law
How later courts described this case
- holding that where appellate court fairly evaluates relevant evidence using correct legal standards, that court’s judgment will not be reversed where sufficiently supported by evidence and law
- noting the “considerable overlap” between these issues, but suggesting that a court of appeals decision would be “incomplete” if it does not address each issue separately because the Court of Criminal Appeals “has for some time taken the position that an attenuation analysis is logically distinct from one involving only questions of voluntariness”
- “Even if our own decision might have been different on the question presented, we cannot accept the proposition that an appellate court’s judgment ought to be subject to reversal on such basis, at least when the evidence is sufficient to support it. Doing so only tends to undermine the respective roles of this and the intermediate courts without significant contribution to the criminal jurisprudence of the State. This Court should reserve its discretionary review prerogative, for the most part, to dispel any confusion generated in the past by our own case law, to reconcile settled differences between the various courts of appeals, and to promote the fair administration of justice by trial and appellate courts throughout Texas.”
- "Even if our own decision might have been different [than the court of appeals] on the question presented, we cannot accept the proposition that an appellate court's judgment ought to be subject to reversal on such basis, at least when the evidence is sufficient to support it. Doing so only tends to undermine the respective roles of this and the intermediate courts without significant contribution to the criminal jurisprudence of the State."
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Guzman v. State, 1997 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 72 (1997)
834 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), overruled in part on other grounds, Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 90
The opinion
OVERSTREET, Judge,
dissenting.
As the majority very well-details, we granted appellant’s petition on a single ground which complained about the propriety of his arrest without a warrant and the admissibility of fruits of a search resulting therefrom. As the majority also well-details, there is a great deal of overlap between the consideration of whether taint has attenuated from fruits seized after a purportedly improper arrest and whether a consent to search given after such an arrest is voluntary. I do not believe the majority adequately addressed the merits of the ground for review. Therefore, I must dissent to such treatment.
Though I might agree with the effect of the majority’s disposition of appellant’s ground for review, I disagree with the methodology by which it arrives at that disposition. In particular, I strongly disagree with the majority’s pronouncement of this Court’s “principal role[,]” and description of “the job of this Court[.]” At 360. Based upon the sentiments expressed in the majority opinion, concisely described as a desire to “leave business of basic appellate review to the intermediate courts[,]” it would appear to me that the author and those who join him want to abdicate the responsibility of being the ultimate interpreters of criminal law in Texas. At 360, n. 2.
I do not see in what manner this Court’s blind acceptance of courts of appeals’ decisions “promote[s] the fair administration of justice by trial and appellate courts throughout Texas.” As this Court is, as the majority points out, the “court of last resort” and “the caretaker of Texas law” (at least with respect to criminal jurisprudence, in which individuals face the loss of life and liberty) I think that it has an obli *369 gation to do more than blindly follow lower courts. I should think that accuracy and precision rather than conscientiousness and good-faith should be the primary objective of the appellate portion of the criminal justice system. Rotely deferring to lower court’s decisions does not facilitate accuracy and precision in the criminal justice system, particularly on those no doubt rare occasions when those decisions are not accurate or precise. Though the various courts of appeals may appreciate this Court “leavpng the] business of basic appellate review to the intermediate courts[,]” considering the volume of petitions for discretionary review that we receive from attorneys representing both the State and convicted defendants, I doubt that such practitioners will be quite as appreciative. Nevertheless, I hope that this new policy does not engender an attitude in courts of appeals of having unfettered discretion in deciding criminal law issues.
I note that recently we have faced a situation in which a court of appeals chose to disregard a remand order from this Court. In Pennock v. State, No. B14-89-00099-CR, 1991 WL 230186 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.], delivered November 7, 1991, pet. pending) (Opinion on Remand), a court of appeals opined that “[w]hile [it], as an intermediate court, [was] obligated to follow the decisions of the court of criminal appeals, [it] d[id] not believe [that it was] obligated to follow an obviously erroneous decision.” [Emphasis in original.] It then proceeded to fail to reconsider a point of error which we had instructed it to so do, apparently based upon its belief that it was not obligated to follow such a supposedly erroneous decision of this Court. Nevertheless, I suggest that the majority’s new policy will encourage (or at least not discourage) other courts of appeals to likewise conclude that they are not bound by this Court’s directives in light of this Court’s expressed desire to “leave [to them the] business of basic appellate review[.]”
Though the court of appeals’ decision in the instant cause may very well be a proper application of the facts and law, I believe that it is this Court’s function and duty to decide whether such is the case rather than merely assuming that such is so because the court of appeals has conducted a “thorough” and “more than adequate” analysis. Judicial restraint is one thing, but “leavpng the] business of basic appellate review to the intermediate courts” is another all together. Interestingly, making such a broad-sweeping policy pronouncement when neither the State nor appellant asked this Court to do so does not appear to be particularly judicially restrained.
It would appear to me that the majority is expressing a desire to abdicate its position as the ultimate interpreter of criminal law in Texas and to pass that responsibility on to the fourteen courts of appeals. I believe that criminal jurisprudence in this State would benefit if that power remained in this Court where the Texas Constitution places it. See TEX. CONST, art. V, § 5. Because the majority sees fit to so surrender this Court’s authority, I vociferously dissent.