holding “we would take the view that we should decline to mandate which of appellant’s first-degree murder convictions must be vacated, but leave it to the trial court on remand to cure the multiple punishment problem, so that it may implement its original sentencing plan”
How later courts described this case
- holding “we would take the view that we should decline to mandate which of appellant’s first-degree murder convictions must be vacated, but leave it to the trial court on remand to cure the multiple punishment problem, so that it may implement its original sentencing plan”
- explaining that “[f]irst-degree premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder are but separate clauses in one statutory provision—D.C. Code § 22-2401 (1981)—murder in the first degree”
- explaining that the Blockburger test is used only if the court has determined the two crimes are statutorily distinct
- imposition of concurrent sentences does not obviate the problem of multiple punishment inherent in dual convictions
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NEWMAN, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I join the opinion of Judge Belson in all respects save one, and write separately only to highlight an additional area of concern which I have. I have serious doubt as to whether second-degree murder is a lesser included offense of felony murder. See Towles v. United States, 496 A.2d 560 , slip op. at 7, n. 6 (D.C. July 25, 1985) (vacated by en banc order dated October 1, 1985 when the court decided to rehear en banc). I have the same “substantial doubt” expressed by Judge Ferren in his dissent on this issue in Towles .