The opinion
*80 KEITH, Justice, concurring.
We concur in the holding of the Chief Justice in Parts I and III of the foregoing opinion. We do not agree with Part II thereof and this concurrence, therefore, will be the controlling and majority opinion as to the matters herein discussed; and, we are authorized to state that the Chief Justice designates Part II of his opinion as his dissent in this cause.
We do not agree to an affirmation of a judgment which awarded each plaintiff a fifth of a million dollars more than the jury found him to be entitled. 1 The jury found in answer to Special Issue No. 3 that Dor-man’s damage amounted to $840,421.86 and that precise sum was set forth in the judgment he recovered against Columbia. 2 In answer to Special Issue No. 4, the jury found that Blackshear’s damage totaled the sum of $715,507.25 which was set forth in his judgment against Columbia.
As stated in the plaintiffs' brief:
“Kirby, Gulf States, Casey, Minnis, and McBride made a voluntary payment to Dorman and Blaekshear for two hundred thousand ($200,000.00) dollars each prior to trial and filed and reserved their cross-actions against Columbia for contribution and indemnity pursuant to Article 2212a, V.A.C.S.” (emphasis supplied) 3
Motions in limine sustained by the trial court prevented Columbia from making such fact known to the jury. The Court submitted to the jury only the question of negligence as applicable to the plaintiffs, Columbia, and Kirby. No submission was made as to the other named defendants. As noted by the Chief Justice in Part II of his opinion, the jury fixed the percentage of negligence against Columbia as one hundred percent.
Over Columbia’s objections, the trial court entered judgment for the respective plaintiffs for the precise amounts found by the jury as compensation for their total damages and refused to allow any credit for the $400,000 which the plaintiffs had already received from the settling defendants. Thus, while each plaintiff recovered judgment for the total amount the jury fixed as his damages, each plaintiff has retained the $200,000 which he had received from the settling defendants. This chart reflects the true facts:
Dorman’s Recovery:
Jury verdict for total damages: $ 840,421.86
Cash paid by settling defendants: 200,000.00
Total recovery: $1,040,421.86
Blackshear’s Recovery:
Jury verdict for total damages: $ 715,507.25
Cash paid by settling defendants: 200,000.00
Total recovery: $ 915,507.25
Moreover, the trial court ordered Columbia, in the judgment, to pay to the several settling defendants the amount of their contributions to the two plaintiffs. The net effect of these two rulings was to permit each plaintiff to keep his windfall excess damages of $200,000 and required Columbia to make whole the settling defendants for their voluntary contributions to plaintiffs’ settlements. Part III of the opinion of the Chief Justice, supra, has rectified the latter aberration and we do not further comment on the point.
We now quote from a few of the authoritative decisions of our courts upon which *81 we rely in confining each plaintiff’s recovery to the total damages fixed by the jury:
(1) Chief Justice Hickman in Bradshaw v. Baylor University, 126 Tex. 99 , 84 S.W.2d 703, 705 (1935):
“It is a rule of general acceptation that an injured party is entitled to but one satisfaction for the injuries sustained by him. . . . There being but one injury, there can, in justice, be but one satisfaction for that injury. . . . ”
(2) Chief Justice Greenhill in Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex.1964):
“Perkins relies on a number of Texas cases which state the rule that the non-settling tortfeasor is entitled to credit on the judgment for the amount already paid for the covenant not to sue. . . ”
(3) Mr. Justice Pope in McMillen v. Klingensmith, 467 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex.1971):
“In holding as we do, we preserve the rule that a claimant in no event will be entitled to recover more than the amount required for full satisfaction of his damages. . . . ”
(4) Mr. Justice Steakley in T. L. James and Company, Inc. v. Statham, 558 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Tex.1977): '
“We adhere to the rule stated in [ Bradshaw, supra] and explicitly reaffirmed in [McMillin, supra], that a claimant in no event will be entitled to recover more than the amount required for full satisfaction of his damages.”
Many other authorities could be cited but to do so would belabor a point well settled by our own Supreme Court. 4 Even Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d 409, 419-420 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.), relied upon by the Chief Justice, is in accord with the views expressed in the Bradshaw and Statham cases cited above.
We do not consider Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc., 592 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1979), either persuasive, pertinent, or apposite. It is a case from another jurisdiction whose holdings are not controlling. The case arose under the Jones Act “and general maritime law” which was decided in a federal court in Louisiana and the opinion did not touch, even tangentially, any Texas cases or statutes. If such a doctrine set out in Leger is to be imported into Texas law, it should be done by the legislature or by our Supreme Court.
Conclusion
Consequently, the judgment of the trial court which awarded Dorman and Black-shear the precise sums found by the jury in answer to Special Issues 3 and 4, respectively, is now reduced as to each plaintiff by the sum of $200,000 which each plaintiff received from the settling defendants; and, as reformed, the judgment as to the said plaintiffs is now affirmed; the portion of the judgment which awarded the subrogat-ed worker’s compensation insurance carrier (and its attorneys) a portion of the sum awarded to each plaintiff is affirmed; the portion of the judgment which ordered Columbia to pay to the settling defendants the amount which said defendants had paid to plaintiffs is reversed and judgment rendered denying said settling defendants any recovery against Columbia.
Pursuant to the provisions of Tex.R. Civ.P. 448, for reasons apparent from this concurring opinion, one-third of the costs in all courts is assessed against the plaintiffs, jointly and severally; one-third of said costs is adjudged against the settling defendants (as set out in footnote 3, supra), jointly and severally; and, one-third of said costs is adjudged against Columbia.
Affirmed in part, modified and affirmed in part, and in part reversed and rendered. It is so ordered.
.The damage issues as to Dorman and Black-shear were submitted separately but the question propounded was the same in each instance: “What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence would fairly and reasonably compensate [Dorman or Blaekshear] for his injuries, if any, which you find from a preponderance of the evidence resulted from the occurrence in question?” This was followed by a listing of seven elements of damage authorized for consideration and the jury, in each instance, placed a monetary figure opposite such element of damage.
. In each instance, the subrogated compensation insurer was awarded its payments which were deducted from the sums awarded in the judgment to Dorman and Blaekshear pursuant to the subrogation provisions of the Worker’s Compensation Act.
. The payment of $400,000, divided equally between the two plaintiffs, was made up by contributions as follows: Kirby — $200,000; Gulf States — $100,000; Casey — $45,000; Minnis— $30,000; and McBride — $25,000.
. See, e. g., McCrary v. Taylor, 579 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n. r. e.), quoting from the foregoing line of cases and, additionally, citing and quoting from Restatement (Second), Torts 2d § 885(3) (1979), and Schering Corp. v. Giesecke, 589 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1979, writ pending), and authorities therein cited.