The opinion
CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
Unlike the majority I would reach the matter of right to counsel under Article I, § 10 of the Texas Bill of Rights. Conform-ably with proper procedure for appellate review, in a separate and distinct ground of error, Article 40.09, § 9, V.A.C.C.P., appellant has asserted a violation of his State constitutional rights, urging that the Court construe § 10 so as to protect fully “the right of a defendant to communicate with his attorney without intrusions by prosecuting officials.”.
There are decisions of the Court — predating Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) — that vouchsafe privacy for and confidentiality of communications between attorney and client against official abridgement. See Turner v. State, 91 Tex.Cr.R. 627 , 241 S.W. 162 , 163—164 (1922) and Ellis v. State, 149 Tex.Cr.R. 583 , 197 S.W.2d 351, 353 (1946); see also McBride v. State, 121 Tex.Cr.R. 549 , 51 S.W.2d 337 (1932). Even if there were not, however, we would be justified — if not obliged — to hold that purposeful prosecuto-rial intrusion into an attorney-client relationship violates the right to counsel guaranteed by Article I, § 10, supra.
Indeed, to acknowledge and apply provisions of our own Bill of Rights is to insist upon contemporaneous recognition of their continued viability and vitality by all who are official participants in the criminal justice system of this State.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the Court. 1
. The Court truly need not and, in my judgment, should not address the ground of error contending that appellants were denied effective assistance of counsel on account of a conflict of interest. The judgment must be reversed on other grounds, and in the event of another trial surely the one representing appellants before and during the trial of this cause will then be in another line of work.