stating that the “right to an appeal is not a right required by due process of law, nor is it an inherent or inalienable right” and that “[a]n appellate right is entirely statutory in origin and no person or agency may prosecute such an appeal unless the right is conferred by statute”
How later courts described this case
- stating that the “right to an appeal is not a right required by due process of law, nor is it an inherent or inalienable right” and that “[a]n appellate right is entirely statutory in origin and no person or agency may prosecute such an appeal unless the right is conferred by statute”
- noting that “the doctrine of res judicata has been held not to apply to decisions of administrative agencies,” but concluding that the Workmen’s Compensation Commission’s decision that the claimant “was an ‘independent contractor’ was conclusive and not subject to collateral attack by the [Criminal Injuries Compensation] Board”
- reviewing the “long line of cases” in which this Court “has consistently held that the Legislature cannot divest the courts of the inherent power they possess to review and correct actions by an administrative agency which are arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable”
- “[T]his Court, in a long line of cases, has consistently held that the Legislature cannot divest the courts of the inherent power they posses to review and correct actions by an administrative agency which are arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Eldridge, J.,
dissenting:
Maryland Code (1957, 1973 Repl. Vol.), Art. 26A, § 10 (a), provides for judicial review of decisions of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board only where the Attorney General or the Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services believes that the “award is improper.” The statute mandates that “There shall be no other judicial review of any decision made or action taken by the Board . . . .” Such *522 language, in my view, does more than merely preclude judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol.), Art. 41, § 255 (a). It prohibits judicial review whether by the Administrative Procedure Act, mandamus, certiorari, or otherwise.
With respect to the basis for the circuit court’s decision, I believe that where no constitutional right or issue of procedural due process is involved, and where no pre-existing personal or property right is present, the Legislature may constitutionally couple the award of a gratuity with a condition precluding judicial review. Therefore, I would reverse.