providing a recent and thorough examination of the interplay between summary judgment standards and the actual malice standard
How later courts described this case
- providing a recent and thorough examination of the interplay between summary judgment standards and the actual malice standard
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
McCAFFERY, J.,
Concurring:
¶ 1 While the state of the law in this Commonwealth compels my concurrence in the well-reasoned majority Opinion of my esteemed colleague, the Honorable Corr-éale F. Stevens, I am compelled to register my disapproval with the way the “actual malice” standard must be applied in this case. As the majority correctly states, to prove “actual malice” one must demonstrate that the defendant knew the statement was false or entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the publication. Lewis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 833 A.2d 185, 191 (Pa.Super.2003). This is a rigorous, if not impossible, burden to meet in most circumstances.
¶ 2 In this case, the “actual malice” standard operates to allow an egregious and damaging misstatement of fact regarding a law enforcement officer to be published without any repercussions for the author or for the publication which has disseminated the false statement. 'While I agree that a newspaper should not be held to a standard which would require a thorough investigation of every statement set forth in its editorial section, certainly a contention that a law enforcement officer had previously been arraigned for the sexual abuse of women and children should have triggered a heightened level of caution on the part of a “responsible” publication. This is especially true in that the newspaper had previously published numerous letters to the editor authored by Oscar Lee Brownstein, in which letters Mr. Brownstein had used what the newspaper’s assistant editor characterized as “a lot of rhetorical hyperbole in his writing.” *1104 (Deposition of Earle Dale Cornelius, III, dated 11/30/00 at 9, 27).
¶ 3 Furthermore, it is anathema that we must allow the actual author of the injurious statement, Mr. Brownstein, to evade responsibility and avoid liability merely by professing to have made a mistake. This is particularly troubling in that because the case was only at the summary judgment stage, the trial court’s assessment that Appellant presented insufficient evidence regarding Mr. Brownstein’s alleged “mistake” has effectively stripped Appellant of any chance of redress for the publication which has harmed his reputation in a way which no “retraction” could ever rectify.
¶ 4 Nevertheless, Pennsylvania law requires that the onerous “actual malice” standard be applied. Thus, I am bound to join in the majority in affirming the trial court’s order.