recognizing that "[o]ur courts have long expressed a distaste" for sharp practices, which are practices "employed by some members of the bar that are not explicitly unethical but nonetheless tread perilously close to the line of being unacceptable"
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that "[o]ur courts have long expressed a distaste" for sharp practices, which are practices "employed by some members of the bar that are not explicitly unethical but nonetheless tread perilously close to the line of being unacceptable"
- declaring that "[a]n agreement to settle a lawsuit is a contract, which like all contracts, may be freely entered into and which a court, absent a demonstration of 'fraud or other compelling circumstances,' should honor and enforce as it does other contracts," quoting Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124-25 (App. A-4304-18T2 6 Div. 1983 )
- stating “[t]he settlement of litigation ranks high in our public policy” (quoting Jannarone v. W.T. Co., 65 N.J.Super. 472, 476, 168 A.2d 72 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 35 N.J. 61, 171 A.2d 147 (1961))
- explaining New Jersey’s policy in favor of settlements and that courts should honor settlements “absent compelling circumstances.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice ALBIN,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that plaintiffs attorney did not violate our court rules or our Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs) by not disclosing to the Family Part judge and his adversary the unreported trial court decision in Levine v. Konvitz. I agree with the majority that plaintiffs attorney did not violate our court rules or our RPCs by not disclosing to the Appellate Division that Levine v. Konvitz was on direct appeal at the time defendant filed the motion for leave to appeal. I agree with the majority that the settlement in this case should not be disturbed.
I cannot agree, however, that plaintiffs attorney deserves to be publicly castigated by this Court because, in compliance with our court rules and the RPCs, he did not disclose knowledge about an unpublished trial court decision that would have been harmful to his client’s case. Plaintiffs attorney has a duty of zealous advocacy on behalf of his client within the acceptable bounds of professional behavior. See State ex rel. S.G., 175 N.J. 132, 138 , 814 A.2d 612 (2003) (discussing attorney’s “ ‘duty of loyalty to his or her clients’ ” (quoting In re Opinion No. 653 of the Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, 132 N.J. 124, 129 , 623 A.2d 241 (1993))). Indeed, RPC 1.3 commands that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence ... in representing a client.” I cannot imagine that any *615 client would believe that her attorney acted with “reasonable diligence” if that any legal or ethical obliover information to the adversary that undermined the client’s case.
If an attorney, who protects the interests of his client within the bounds of our codified rules of professional conduct, is to be condemned for “ ‘playing fast and loose’ with the rules” and for engaging in “sharp practices” and behavior “worthy of reproach,” ante at 613, 951 A.2d at 969, then we owe it to the bar to set forth precisely what he did to merit this judicial pillory. If the majority believes that, in the future, attorneys should be required to disclose to their adversaries and the court their knowledge of unpublished trial court decisions that are inconsistent with their clients’ positions, then it should say so, and the bar can act accordingly.
However close plaintiffs attorney came to the line separating professional from unprofessional conduct, he did not cross the line demarcated by our court rules and RPCs. I do not encourage attorneys to dance close to that line. Nevertheless, plaintiffs attorney should not be publicly rebuked when, by the majority’s own account, he did not violate the rules of court and professional conduct, and abided by his duty of loyalty to his client, but yet crossed the line of some unwritten code of behavior to which the majority subscribes.
Otherwise, I respectfully concur with the well-reasoned opinion of the majority.
Justice WALLACE joins in this opinion.
For reversal and Justice RABNER and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO and