holding that the term “convicted” in the Section 9711(d)(10) aggravating circumstance, applying where the defendant has been convicted of another offense for which a life sentence or death was imposable, meant a determination of guilt, as opposed to final imposition of sentence, because the legislature included offenses committed contemporaneously with the offense at issue
How later courts described this case
- holding that the term “convicted” in the Section 9711(d)(10) aggravating circumstance, applying where the defendant has been convicted of another offense for which a life sentence or death was imposable, meant a determination of guilt, as opposed to final imposition of sentence, because the legislature included offenses committed contemporaneously with the offense at issue
- stating that although Miranda does not require that police provide a suspect with information as to the crime under investigation, this Court has - 14 - J-S09016-26 held “a suspect must have ‘an awareness of the general nature of the transaction giving rise to the investigation,’ in order to make an intelligent and understanding waiver of his rights”
- stating that he joins “in the Court’s mandate today with the caveat that the death penalty will be carried out only after a review of [the challenges to the pleas] by this Court and only if after such review it is determined that the pleas were voluntarily and knowingly entered and the request for withdrawal was properly refused”
- holding that the term “convicted” in the Section 9711(d)(10
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROBERTS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Because appellants are presently represented by the same counsel who represented them at trial and at the death penalty hearing, there has been no meaningful inquiry into whether appellants have been afforded their constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. In the absence *511 of such an inquiry, the reasons for counsel’s strategy, which do not appear of record, cannot be known, and it cannot be determined whether there existed evidence which should have been presented by counsel but was not.
Accordingly, the record should be remanded for the appointment of new counsel, who would be obliged to submit a petition to the court of common pleas addressing the effectiveness of trial counsel. As previously stated, “[ujntil a hearing on counsel’s effectiveness has been held, this Court cannot fairly state that it has discharged its statutory duty to provide a thorough review of the judgment^] of sentence of death.” Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 77 , 454 A.2d 937, 971 (1982) (Roberts, J., joined by O’Brien, C.J., dissenting).