The opinion
KELLY, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
The focus of an inquiry into harmless error must be on the erroneously admitted evidence and the likelihood that it substantially influenced the jury. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 1247—48, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). To be sure, the balance of the evidence adduced at trial is also integral to the harmless error inquiry; however, in my judgment the evidence here did not independently refute the only issue at trial: appellant’s claim of self-defense. Although there was evidence indicating that appellant had previously demonstrated aggressive conduct toward the decedent, there was also ample testimony regarding the decedent’s aggressive acts toward appellant. Thus, the fact that appellant and the decedent had fought before was ambiguous evidence on the question of who was the first aggressor. On the whole, the government’s case was not overwhelming, even in light of appellant’s prior inconsistent statements to the police which, although incriminating, were not central to nor dispositive of her self-defense claim.
The erroneously admitted statement led the jury to believe not only that appellant was capable of attacking the decedent, but also that she previously had committed upon him the same violent act for which she was on trial. See Clark v. United States, D.C.App., 412 A.2d 21, 30 (1980) (erroneous admission of state of mind testimony reversible error where the testimony established that appellant had previously committed a crime of violence toward same victim). The trial judge improperly instructed the jury as soon as the testimony was given, and repeated the erroneous instruction before the jury retired to deliberate. In addition, the prosecutor, in closing argument, invited the jury, not only to view Graves’ statement as reflecting on appellant’s state of mind, but also to assume the truth of the statement and compare the similarities between the two stabbings. It *749 is unrealistic to think that the jury’s verdict was not substantially swayed by this testimony. * Consequently, I would hold that its admission is reversible error.
The statement in this case, accompanied by an invitation of misuse, is much more prejudicial than the hearsay statements requiring reversal in Fox v. United States, D.C.App., 421 A.2d 9 (1980) (question of limiting instruction not discussed); Clark v. United States, supra at 24 (jury cautioned that testimony was only admissible to show the deceased’s state of mind); and United States v. Brown, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 190, 194 , 490 F.2d 758, 762 (1973) (as amended 1974) (jury instructed that it was not to consider the hearsay testimony to evaluate the state of mind or conduct of the defendant).