"As successive PCHA petitions are the exceptions, concrete allegations of actual prejudice should be expressed in those petitions. Abstract assertions will not suffice . . . petitioner must be able to demonstrate a specific factual predicate for prejudice caused by alleged errors. . . ."
How later courts described this case
- "As successive PCHA petitions are the exceptions, concrete allegations of actual prejudice should be expressed in those petitions. Abstract assertions will not suffice . . . petitioner must be able to demonstrate a specific factual predicate for prejudice caused by alleged errors. . . ."
- waiver of issues raised in sixth PCHA petition filed twenty-four years after entry of guilty plea
- opinion announcing the judgment of the court
- Opinion by Larsen, J.
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NIX, Justice,
concurring.
I share the belief that the court below properly dismissed the Post Conviction hearing petition filed in this case without a hearing. I am troubled by the lengthy exposition of the majority which does more to confuse than to illuminate the factors involved.
The Act as drafted was most explicit in this regard. Section 1180-5 sets forth the information required in a petition and further notes that “the failure to raise any such issue in such petition shall be deemed a waiver of any right to future presentation of another petition containing grounds for relief that were available and could have been presented. 19 P.S. § 1180-5(b).
Further, section 1180-9 provides, inter alia, that the court, “may deny a hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and is without trace of support either in the record or from other evidence submitted by the petition.” 19 P.S. § 1180-9. It would appear to me that these two sections clearly cover the concerns expressed in the majority opinion and that an attempt to set forth a list of factors, admittedly incomplete, serves no real purpose.
Nor do I believe that a fair reading of prior decisions suggest that a mere assertion of ineffectiveness justifies a finding of extraordinary circumstances that would avoid the waiver provision of section 1180-4. 19 P.S. § 1180-4; Commonwealth v. Marsh, 460 Pa. 253 , 333 A.2d 181 (1975); Commonwealth v. Ashley, 277 Pa.Super. 287 , 419 A.2d 775 (1980). The Act itself requires that the petition must fully set forth the factual basis supporting the claim. 19 P.S. § 1180-5. Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 490 Pa. 296 , 416 A.2d 477 (1980); Commonwealth v. Sherard, 483 Pa. 183 , 394 A.2d 971 (1978); Commonwealth v. Yocham, 473 Pa. 445 , 375 A.2d 325 (1977); Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Pa. 658 , 334 *41 A.2d 282 (1975). Additionally, ineffective assistance of counsel, as it has been developed under our cases, addresses substantial derelictions on the part of counsel and not merely a showing of trivial and inconsequential errors or omissions. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 490 Pa. 380 , 416 A.2d 986 (1980); Commonwealth v. Smith, 478 Pa. 76 , 385 A.2d 1320 (1978).
I therefore share the view of Mr. Justice Flaherty that the majority’s efforts today succeed only in creating an “unnecessary complexity” into an area that certainly does not require further obfuscation.