explaining that it is now virtually.universally accepted that a person with a blood alcohol percent of .10 should not be driving, and that such percentage should be accepted as prima facie evidence of intoxication
How later courts described this case
- explaining that it is now virtually.universally accepted that a person with a blood alcohol percent of .10 should not be driving, and that such percentage should be accepted as prima facie evidence of intoxication
- upholding the imposition of absolute criminal liability where the Commonwealth failed to charge or prove culpability pursu ant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a)(4), driving with a blood alcohol of .10%, and the defendant was sentenced to less than ninety days imprisonment
- finding that the General Assembly has a compelling interest in protecting citizens against drunk drivers
- stating “there is no constitutional, statutory or common law right to the consumption of any quantity of alcohol before driving”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
McDERMOTT, Justice,
concurring.
There are none so brave, none surer of their faculties than one warmed with the fruits of forgotten summers. That they may imbibe more than the legal limit is a risk they take, if they drive. Every risk they forgo is one less for everybody. It is a quibble to suggest that one may not know his own limit, when as Mr. Justice Larsen notes, the State could prohibit an eyedrop. I agree with the majority that the imposition of absolute liability is permissible in the case at hand, Cf. Commonwealth v. Field, 490 Pa. 519 , 417 A.2d 160 (1980) (upholding Section 3732 of the Vehicle Code against constitutional attack), and for that reason I join in the decision to reverse.
However, I believe that the majority’s discussion regarding culpability in cases involving sentences of 90 days or more is somewhat premature and for that reason I write separately. Section 3731(e)(l)(iii) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(e)(l)(iii), provides that a person is subject to imprisonment for not less than ninety days if he has “twice previously been convicted of an offense under this section or of an equivalent offense in this or other jurisdictions within the previous seven years.” There is nothing in this record to indicate that appellee here has been previously convicted of driving while intoxicated. Thus, he was not subject to the 90 days provisions of the statute.
I would go no further than to hold that the imposition of absolute liability in this case does not offend appellee’s constitutional rights.