holding that under doctrine of collateral estoppel, factual findings from hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of counsel precluded legal malpractice claim, even though legal standards for these claims were not equivalent
How later courts described this case
- holding that under doctrine of collateral estoppel, factual findings from hearing on claim of ineffective assistance of counsel precluded legal malpractice claim, even though legal standards for these claims were not equivalent
- holding that “opinions and orders ... do not constitute matters outside the pleading[s]”
- holding that matters of public record are not treated as matters outside the pleadings
- affirming dismissal on basis of collateral estoppel
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STEADMAN, Associate Judge,
with whom SCHWELB, Associate Judge, joins, concurring:
I am in complete agreement with Judge Newman’s opinion, with a single caveat relating to the holding in footnote 7 of Brown v. Jonz, 572 A.2d 455 (D.C.1990). It is clear to me, as Judge Newman states, that that holding is limited to the proposition that legal malpractice claims are not automatically barred whenever a plaintiff has pursued unsuccessfully a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. That holding reflects, at the least, the position that the standards for ineffective assistance and legal malpractice *214 are not always essentially equivalent. 1 I see no occasion to explore that holding further for purposes of this appeal. As the cases cited by Judge Newman themselves illustrate, as indeed does this very appeal before us, there may be aspects of civil litigation against criminal defense attorneys, in addition to questions of the standard of care, which were not addressed by Jonz. See generally Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Legal Malpractice in Defense of Criminal Prosecution, 4 A.L.R.5th 273 (1992).
. Jonz was a civil action “based primarily on Brown's allegations of Jonz’s breach of contract.” Id. Brown had hired Jonz as his defense attorney to represent him in the criminal proceeding.