stating that the legislature is presumed *561 not to engage in unnecessary or meaningless acts and statutes must be interpreted so no part is rendered superfluous or insignificant
How later courts described this case
- stating that the legislature is presumed *561 not to engage in unnecessary or meaningless acts and statutes must be interpreted so no part is rendered superfluous or insignificant
- stating that the legislature is presumed not to engage in unnecessary or meaningless acts and statutes must be interpreted so no part is rendered superfluous or insignificant
- discussing, in the context of self-defense instructions, approval of instructions directing the jury to evaluate the reasonableness of defendant’s actions in light of all the circumstances
- evidence showed that before the shooting the decedent refused to leave defendant's friend's residence despite numerous requests to do so
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in Lewis v. Department of Licensing
88 Wn.2d 221, 239 , 559 P.2d 548 (1977) (when raising a claim of self-defense, the “defendant’s actions are to be judged against her own subjective impressions and not those which a detached jury might determine to be objectively reasonable”), superseded by statute on other grounds by Lewis v. State, Dept. of Licensing, 125 Wn. App. 666, 679-80
Distinguished
Distinguished by Lewis v. STATE, DEPT. OF LICENSING, 157 Wash. 2d 446 (2006)
¶ 32 The State argues that because Wanrow is distinguishable and conversations with a police officer are not private, this court should interpret RCW 9.73.090(1)(c) as merely a safe harbor provision.
Distinguished by State v. Forrester, 21 Wash. App. 855 (1978)
88 Wn.2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977), cited by the defendant, is distinguishable.
The opinion
Hamilton, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent, for I believe the tape recording was properly admitted under RCW 9.73.090(1). I also do not feel that the jury instructions were so prejudicial that a new trial must be granted.
The majority states that the words in RCW 9.73.090(1) "for the purpose and only for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of reception of emergency calls" restrict the recording's use to verification only; therefore, these emergency recordings are still inadmissible under RCW 9.73.050. I disagree. This interpretation of RCW 9.73.090(1) completely ignores the first portion of RCW 9.73.090, which opens with a waiver of RCW 9.73.030 through RCW 9.73.080, 9 i.e., the recording is not unlawful under RCW 9.73.030; there is no need to procure a court order permitting interception under RCW 9.73.040; the information obtained is not inadmissible in any civil or criminal case under RCW 9.73.050; there is no civil liability under RCW 9.73.060; and, there is no criminal liability under RCW 9.73.080. It is an established rule of statutory construction that courts are obliged to interpret a statute, if possible, so that no portion of it is superfluous, void, or insignificant. Snow's Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Morgan, 80 Wn.2d 283 , 494 P.2d 216 (1972); Des Moines v. Hemenway, 73 Wn.2d 130 , 437 P.2d 171 (1968). Interpreting the words "for the purpose and only for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of *243 reception of emergency calls" as reinstating the exclusionary rule of RCW 9.73.050 renders void and superfluous the first portion of RCW 9.73.090 insofar as it pertains to waiving RCW 9.73.050.
The majority states that the distinction between subsections (1) and (2) of RCW 9.73.090 strongly indicates that "the legislature did not intend recordings made under subsection (1) to be available for use in court." I do not believe this distinction indicates any such legislative intent. Subsection (2) deals with video and/or sound recordings of arrested persons. By their very nature these recordings are made for use in court against the arrested person, and strict guidelines must be set down for the protection of the arrested person. On the other hand, recordings of emergency phone calls under subsection (1) are not made with the specific objective of using them in court. Thus, there is no need for the strict guidelines set out in subsection (2). In finding legislative intent from the absence of strict guidelines in subsection (1), the majority ignores the basic difference between the recording of an emergency call for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of information received, and the video and/or sound recording of an arrested person for the purpose of using such a recording as evidence in a court proceeding.
The majority reads the words "for the purpose and only for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of reception of emergency calls" as strictly limiting the use which may be made of the recording of the emergency phone call, i.e., it can only be used to verify information and cannot be used in a court proceeding. RCW 9.73.090(1) does not speak of uses; rather, it speaks of purposes. I read RCW 9.73.090(1) as waiving the exclusionary rule of RCW 9.73.050, if the purpose of recording the emergency call was to verify the accuracy of the information received. Once it is determined that the police have recorded the emergency call for the proper purpose, then RCW 9.73.030 through RCW 9.73.080 do not apply, and the tape recording is admissible in a judicial proceeding.
*244 Further, exclusionary rules operate in derogation of a court's primary function of determining truth and are adopted by courts and legislatures to further some societal interest deemed of greater importance than seeking truth. I believe the legislature enacted the exclusionary rule of RCW 9.73.050 as an additional deterrent to the intercepting and recording of private communications or conversations. 10 Courts have long recognized that subjecting police officials to criminal or civil liability does not always deter them from improperly obtaining evidence. Because police officials may not be so deterred, courts have resorted to the exclusionary rule to deter them from improperly obtaining evidence. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 , 41 L. Ed. 2d 182 , 94 S. Ct. 2357 (1974); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 , 81 S. Ct. 1684 , 84 A.L.R.2d 933 (1961); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434 , 282 P.2d 905 (1955); and State v. McFarland, 84 Wn.2d 391 , 526 P.2d 361 (1974). No one can doubt the propriety of recording emergency calls to verify the accuracy of the relayed information. Persons calling in may only be able to give information once, and it is extremely important that police and fire personnel receive the correct information so as to deal with the emergency as quickly as possible. The legislature saw no reason to deter the recording of emergency telephone calls and therefore removed the sanctions of RCW 9.73.050, RCW 9.73.060, and RCW 9.73.080 to recording emergency telephone calls, when the purpose of such a recording was to verify the accuracy of the information received.
My interpretation of RCW 9.73.090(1) does not mean that all conversations and all parts of conversations recorded pursuant to RCW 9.73.090(1) will be admissible. By the terms of the statute, the phone calls must be *245 incoming and relating to an emergency, and the police must be recording the call for emergency purposes. If police or fire personnel use the emergency call to gather investigatory information or to interrogate a suspected defendant, the tape recording of that emergency call will lose its immunity under RCW 9.73.090(1) and will be inadmissible into evidence under RCW 9.73.050.
With the above requirements in mind, I turn to the facts in this case. After the defendant shot Mr. Wesler, she also fired a few more shots, one of which struck David Kelly in the arm. He immediately fled from the house. Immediately after the shootings, Ms. Hooper called the police, using the police crime check emergency number. After she reported the facts, Ms. Hooper was told by the police operator to stay on the line. At this point, the defendant took the phone from Ms. Hooper. The police operator did not ask to talk to the person who did the shooting. Rather, the defendant's taking of the telephone was a purely voluntary act done at the instigation of Ms. Hooper. This kept the status of this communication as an incoming emergency call.
Later in the conversation the defendant became anxious about remaining on the line and communicated to the police operator her desire to terminate the conversation. The operator told her to stay on the line. At this point in the conversation, the police operator had dispatched a police prowl car and ambulance to the scene. He knew that the defendant had a gun and that two people had been shot, one inside the house and one outside who possibly was coming back armed with a weapon. It was very important for the police operator to stabilize the situation at Ms. Hooper's house. If the police operator had allowed the defendant to leave the phone, the police officers coming to the scene would have approached the house with one armed person inside the house, obviously frightened and nervous. The approaching officers would also have had no knowledge as to whether the wounded person outside had made any attempts to reenter the house. I believe it was imperative *246 that the police operator keep the defendant on the phone line for the protection of the approaching police officers, the defendant, the other occupants of Ms. Hooper's house, and the wounded person who could have been somewhere in the vicinity. The entire phone communication indicates an intent on the part of the police operator to keep the communication line open and to stabilize the situation so that more people were not hurt. He made no overt attempt to interrogate the defendant or to gather incriminating information. Under my interpretation of RCW 9.73.090(1), the whole communication falls within the emergency immunity of RCW 9.73.090(1), and the trial court committed no error by admitting the tape recording of the communication into evidence.
I also do not believe that the defendant is entitled to a new trial because of the jury instructions. Although instruction No. 10 did not direct the jury to consider all of the surrounding circumstances, see State v. Miller, 141 Wash. 104 , 250 P. 645 (1926), and State v. Lewis, 6 Wn. App. 38 , 491 P.2d 1062 (1971), this deficiency was corrected by the giving of instruction No. 12. 11 Instructions must be considered as a whole and if, when so considered, they properly state the law, they are sufficient. See State v. Stafford, 44 Wn.2d 353, 355 , 267 P.2d 699 (1954); State v. Refsnes, 14 Wn.2d 569, 572 , 128 P.2d 773 (1942); State v. Smith, 196 Wash. 534 , 83 P.2d 749 (1938). The trial court instructed the jury to "consider the instructions as a whole and . . . not place undue emphasis on any particular instruction or part thereof." In my view, the instructions were not so prejudicial so as to require a new trial for the defendant.
*247 For the above reasons, I would conclude that the defendant received a fair trial and that the decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed and the judgment of the trial court upon the jury verdict reinstated.
Stafford, C.J., and Rosellini, J., concur with Hamilton, J.
Petition for rehearing denied April 5, 1977.
The first sentence of RCW 9.73.090 begins with: "The provisions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080 shall not apply to police and fire personnel in the following instances:".
The other deterrents to intercepting and recording private communications are found in RCW 9.73.060 and RCW 9.73.080. RCW 9.73.060 provides for civil liability for any person who, directly or by means of a detective agency or any other agent, violates RCW 9.73.030. RCW 9.73.080 provides for criminal liability for any person who violates RCW 9.73.030.
Inatruction No. 12 reads:
"In connection with the defense of justification, you are instructed that you may consider the words and actions of the deceased prior to the homicide, the relative size and strength of the persons involved, together with any and all factors which in your judgment may bear upon your determination as to whether the defendant reasonably believed herself in danger of grievous bodily harm at the time in question. But a person who is attacked has no right to use greater *247 force than he or she honestly believes is necessary, or has reasonable grounds to believe is necessary for self-defense.
"There is no legal justification or excuse for a private person to deliberately assault another as a result of anger or to inflict vengeance."