stating that the legislature is presumed *561 not to engage in unnecessary or meaningless acts and statutes must be interpreted so no part is rendered superfluous or insignificant
How later courts described this case
- stating that the legislature is presumed *561 not to engage in unnecessary or meaningless acts and statutes must be interpreted so no part is rendered superfluous or insignificant
- stating that the legislature is presumed not to engage in unnecessary or meaningless acts and statutes must be interpreted so no part is rendered superfluous or insignificant
- discussing, in the context of self-defense instructions, approval of instructions directing the jury to evaluate the reasonableness of defendant’s actions in light of all the circumstances
- evidence showed that before the shooting the decedent refused to leave defendant's friend's residence despite numerous requests to do so
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in Lewis v. Department of Licensing
88 Wn.2d 221, 239 , 559 P.2d 548 (1977) (when raising a claim of self-defense, the “defendant’s actions are to be judged against her own subjective impressions and not those which a detached jury might determine to be objectively reasonable”), superseded by statute on other grounds by Lewis v. State, Dept. of Licensing, 125 Wn. App. 666, 679-80
Distinguished
Distinguished by Lewis v. STATE, DEPT. OF LICENSING, 157 Wash. 2d 446 (2006)
¶ 32 The State argues that because Wanrow is distinguishable and conversations with a police officer are not private, this court should interpret RCW 9.73.090(1)(c) as merely a safe harbor provision.
Distinguished by State v. Forrester, 21 Wash. App. 855 (1978)
88 Wn.2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977), cited by the defendant, is distinguishable.
The opinion
Wright, J.
(concurring) — I concur with the result reached by the majority for only one of the reasons stated therein.
Were it not for the language of the statute, RCW 9.73-.030 through .090, I would agree that the telephone call here is not a "private conversation." A careful reading of *242 the statute, however, compels a different result. The legislature clearly intended to classify such telephone calls as "private conversations," otherwise the exception contained in RCW 9.73.090(1) would be meaningless and surplusage.
Based upon the clear legislative intent and upon the reasoning fully set out in the opinion as to that one issue, I concur in the result.