holding that testimony about Medicare’s structure, reimbursement and audit processes, and other Medicare concepts was expert testimony because it relied upon an understanding of the workings of “a complex and intricate regulatory scheme ... acquired over years of experience ... as well as [the witnesses’] understanding of various terms”
How later courts described this case
- holding that testimony about Medicare’s structure, reimbursement and audit processes, and other Medicare concepts was expert testimony because it relied upon an understanding of the workings of “a complex and intricate regulatory scheme ... acquired over years of experience ... as well as [the witnesses’] understanding of various terms”
- finding that the district court abused its discretion when it declined to hold an evidentiary hearing because the evidence presented in the defendant’s motion raised issues of fact such that, “absent more detailed examination,” the court could not determine the merits of the motion
- holding that once a defendant “calls the [disputed] matter to the court’s attention, the court may not merely summarily adopt the factual findings in the [PSR] or simply declare that the facts are supported by a preponderance of the evidence”
- concluding that Medicare auditors’ testimony concerning the Medicare reimbursement process and their understanding of certain terms constituted expert testimony subject to Fed.R.Evid. 702
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur in the result reached by the majority with one exception: I do not believe that remand for an evidentiary hearing with respect to the “Potter materials” is required, and I would therefore affirm the district court’s denial of the motion for a new trial. While it would have undeniably been preferable for the government, in an abundance of caution, to have turned over the disputed material, as the district court pointed out in its opinion denying the motion, “it is impossible to conclude that the government’s failure to turn over the altered report somehow undermines the confidence in the outcome of the trial,” nor is there any indication that “Mr. Potter would have testified favorably to the defendants had he been called as a witness.” Memorandum of Opinion and Order, Feb. 2, 2006, at 7.
We review the denial of a motion for a new trial based on Brady violations under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Graham, 484 F.3d 413, 416 , (6th Cir. Apr.20, 2007) (citing United States v. Jones, 399 F.3d 640, 647 (6th Cir.2005)). Under normal circumstances, a defendant seeking a new trial based upon new evidence must show inter alia that the evidence would “likely produce an acquittal.” United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 382 (6th Cir.1997) (citing United States v. O’Dell, 805 F.2d 637, 640 (6th Cir.1986)). When a Brady violation is alleged, however, the standard is less onerous: a defendant must only show that the favorable evidence was “material,” which “does not depend upon ‘whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.’ ” Id. at 382-83 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)).
Like the district court, I believe that defendants have not shown that the materials that came belatedly to light would have undermined confidence in the verdict. On the contrary, it is more likely than not, as the district court explained, that the opinion of Mr. Potter and the materials *420 related to its formation would have been unfavorable to defendants’ position. After all, he cited this case in promoting the value of his professional services, taking “credit for the convictions.” Memorandum of Opinion and Order at 7. In short, I detect no abuse of discretion on the part of the district court and would therefore affirm its denial of a new trial.