The opinion
JACKSON, Justice
(dissenting).
Plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction to restrain further proceedings in connection with the proposed bond issue but is entitled to an injunction against the execution of any proposed contracts that violate the Oklahoma Constitution.
The majority opinion states:
“The City agrees to pay the cost of maintenance, insurance and for damages for personal injuries or property during the term of the lease. * * * When required, the City is to construct additional hangar space to be leased upon terms similar to those of the original facilities. * * * The City does agree to co-operate with the Trustees and to pay expenses incident to operation and maintenance of its airports. This obligation rests upon the City in any event.”
It will be observed from the majority opinion that these obligations to pay expenses incident to operation and maintenance, insurance premiums, and the construction of additional hangar space is to continue for a period of twenty-seven years. I am of the opinion that these obligations create a debt in an amount exceeding, in any year, the income and revenue provided for such year, and are in violation of section 26, article 10, Oklahoma Constitution. I have carefully examined the opinion and the syllabi and do not find' that the opinion has specifically settled that issue.
The' opinion does say “This obligation rests upon the City in any event.” No authority is cited. This conclusion is obviously made without careful consideration. There is no legal requirement that a city own an airport. There is certainly no legal obligation on ■ any ' municipality ' to *140 continue to own or to operate and maintain an airport if it is a losing proposition year after year. Since there is no obligation upon the' city to own and operate an airport how can it be said it is under an obligation to pay expenses incident to operation and maintenance of its airport? If this is a legal obligation resting upon the city there is no necessity for placing it in the contract.
It must be observed that the majority opinion cites prior decisions of this court having to do with financing of State Institutions. They deal with state indebtedness and an interpretation of sections 23, 24, and 25, art. 10, Oklahoma Constitution, and are not decisive of the constitutionality of the proposed contract. Constitutional provisions limiting municipal indebtedness are found in secs. 26 & 27, art. 10, Oklahoma Constitution. The majority opinion fails to discuss these provisions and our former opinions in connection therewith.
If in the future the city officials should decide for any reason not to pay the insurance premiums and expenses of operation and maintenance it may then become apparent that these are not legal obligations.
In City of McAlester v. State ex rel. State Board of Public Affairs, 195 Okl. 1 , 154 P.2d 579 , the city officials concluded that their contract to supply water to the State Penitentiary was in violation of sec. 26, art. 10, Oklahoma Constitution, .and threatened to discontinue the service. This court there held:
“A contract .entered into between the State Board of Public Affairs and the city of McAlester whereby the former agrees to furnish all work and labor necessary to the construction of an extension of the water system of the city in consideration for water to be furnished at the city’s, expense to a .state institution over a period of years at a specified price per gallon, to be credited against the cost of such work and labor until fully discharged, constitutes a charge against the municipality’s funds beyond the current fiscal year, and, in the absence of assent of the voters of said city as provided by section 27, article 10, Constitution, is void.” (Evidently meaning Section 26 of Art. 10).
In the body of the opinion it was said:
“The record reveals that the finances of the city were pledged far beyond the current fiscal year, for the purpose of supplying water to the penitentiary. Those finances were in the form of future expenses in furnishing the water. * * * The funds necessary to such operation were pledged far beyond the fiscal year, funds not yet in existence, and the contracts were void.”
I see no legal distinction between the contract in the McAlester case and the contract here.
For the reasons stated, ■ I must respectfully dissent.