“[t]he Superior Court [ — in Yachymiak and Wharton — ] has addressed the effect of joint jury/bench trials in a context slightly different from the one here”
How later courts described this case
- “[t]he Superior Court [ — in Yachymiak and Wharton — ] has addressed the effect of joint jury/bench trials in a context slightly different from the one here”
- acquittal after bench trial for accidents involving death barred retrial for vehicular homicide and other offenses where the trial court announced it was not convinced the defendant was the driver of the vehicle
- “While the Copening court’s rationale is logical . . . it still would not control the circumstances of this case” because it “did not involve a hung jury and the prospect of a retrial.”
- criminal collateral estoppel “must be viewed through the lens of double jeopardy
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice EAKIN
dissenting.
I join Mr. Justice Castille’s dissenting opinion. The trial court had one duty — determine whether the evidence warranted a verdict of guilty or not guilty on the Accidents Involving Death charge. The court was not empowered to bind the jury by finding specific facts. This case does not come to this Court in the posture of evaluating the evidence that may support a finding of guilt on the other charges, which were before the jury — there is no conviction against which to test that sufficiency. The question here is collateral estoppel.
There were 13 fact-finders here. As to one count, the trial court was the fact-finder — as to the other counts, the 12-person jury was the fact-finder. While the 12 jurors were unable to reach a unanimous verdict, we do not know on what issues that inability was based. It may be that all 12 found appellee was the driver, but disagreed on other elements of the charges. To foist upon these 12 the findings of the one fact-finder not involved in those charges is inappropriate.
The majority notes collateral estoppel, in the criminal context, “bar[s] redetermination in a second prosecution of those issues necessarily determined between the parties in a first proceeding----” Majority Op., at 458, 938 A.2d at 1020 (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 518 Pa. 15 , 540 A.2d 246, 251 *482 (1988) (citation omitted)). The trial court here did not “necessarily determine” driving was not proved — it found appellee not guilty, then went beyond its obligation and stated the reasons for its determination. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/15/04, at 3 (“[T]his [c]ourt admitted at the hearing on the motion to dismiss that the reason for its verdict of not guilty was that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt ... [appellee] had been driving the vehicle at the time of the accident.” (citation omitted)).
Simply put, the “finding” that driving was not proved is not something found in a criminal verdict. Had the jury found appellee guilty, and been hung on other charges, would the matter of driving be “necessarily determined?” Yes, for it necessarily was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, witness the convictions. At a retrial for the unresolved charges, would proof of driving be necessary? One must assume it would, for it is an element of the crime, and the determination of one fact-finder should not bind another.
If the court wished to direct a verdict on the other counts, for want of proof of driving, it could have done so, but that is not the question before us. The question is collateral estoppel — there is no practice equivalent to civil practice in a criminal prosecution. Here, the specific findings in the verdict slip are limited to one ultimate question: “guilty” or “not guilty.” In a criminal verdict, there simply are no “necessary determinations” made that estop anything.
Based on the foregoing, I would affirm the trial court’s order denying appellee’s pre-trial motion to dismiss the charges against him on double jeopardy grounds.