“[t]he Superior Court [ — in Yachymiak and Wharton — ] has addressed the effect of joint jury/bench trials in a context slightly different from the one here”
How later courts described this case
- “[t]he Superior Court [ — in Yachymiak and Wharton — ] has addressed the effect of joint jury/bench trials in a context slightly different from the one here”
- acquittal after bench trial for accidents involving death barred retrial for vehicular homicide and other offenses where the trial court announced it was not convinced the defendant was the driver of the vehicle
- “While the Copening court’s rationale is logical . . . it still would not control the circumstances of this case” because it “did not involve a hung jury and the prospect of a retrial.”
- criminal collateral estoppel “must be viewed through the lens of double jeopardy
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice SAYLOR
concurring.
I join the majority opinion, except for its footnote 8, which addresses the argument that Appellee waived his constitutional double jeopardy protections by pursuing severance, a position ably developed by Mr. Justice Castille in his dissent. See Dissenting Opinion at at 476-81, 938 A.2d at 1031-33 (Castille, J.). On the one hand, the reasoning from United States v. Blyden, 930 F.2d 323 (3rd Cir.1991), cited by Justice Castille, strongly supports the Commonwealth’s position. On the other hand, however, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has developed a contrary rationale, which focuses on the substantial difference between the preclusive effect of a guilty plea or conviction, at issue in the seminal line of United States *472 Supreme Court decisions, 1 and that of an acquittal, such as is at issue here. See Wright v. State, 307 Md. 552 , 515 A.2d 1157, 1162-63 , 1170 n. 5 (1986).
Ultimately, I agree with the Maryland court that the critical questions are whether the trial court’s determination represented a resolution (correct or not) of some or all of the factual elements of the offenses subject to a potential retrial, and if so, whether such resolution would be inconsistent with a finding of guilt on the offenses subject to retrial. If, as here, both questions are answered in the affirmative, I also agree that the federal high Court’s decisions should not be extended to convert a defendant’s pursuit of severance into a blanket waiver encompassing the relevant dynamic of the constitutional interest in freedom from being placed twice in jeopardy.
. See Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 , 104 S.Ct. 2536 , 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (holding that a guilty plea to certain charges did not bar trial as to related offenses, as the plea effectuated a waiver of double jeopardy interests); Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 , 97 S.Ct. 2207 , 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977) (plurality) (holding that a conviction for a lesser included offense did not bar prosecution for the greater offense, where severance of the charges occurred upon the defendant's motion).