Williams v. County of Los Angeles

CLARK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.

After stating the “initial question is whether plaintiff here has a right to his job that is protected by article I, section 7 of the California Constitution,” the majority fail to further address that issue. Finding an undefined property interest in employment at issue, they conclude plaintiff is entitled to procedural rights afforded by Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 539 P.2d 774 ]. Mr. Williams’ discharge without according him those rights is deemed by the majority to be actionable.

The unresolved issue is whether plaintiff, as a recurrent employee, was vested with a property right subject to due process of law. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) Plaintiff apparently claims such interest based on an alleged contractual relationship which, plaintiff contends, defendants cannot dispute having demurred. 1 But, as will be seen, defendants are not bound by plaintiff’s allegation of a fixed term of employment and there is nothing in the record establishing plaintiff possessed such property interest.

It is well established that the terms and conditions of public employment, including term of service, are fixed by enactments of the governing body, and not by contract between agency and civil servant. (Miller v. *738 State of California (1977) 18 Cal.3d 808, 813 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 557 P.2d 970 ], and cases cited on pp. 813-814.) This rule prevails even though the record discloses a contractual commitment for particular conditions of employment. (See Boren v. State Personnel Board (1951) 37 Cal.2d 634 [ 234 P.2d 981 ].)

Here plaintiff alleges a property right in summer employment based on contract. It is essential to his cause of action that he establish his property right to a fixed term of employment else—not having achieved permanent or other vested status—he could not claim a property interest protected by due process requirements. (Cf. Skelly v. State Personnel Board, supra, 15 Cal.3d 194, 206-207 .) The allegation—and admission of such allegation by demurrer—does not establish his claimed property right. In Boren v. State Personnel Board, supra, 37 Cal.2d 634 , a public employee sought to establish a similar property interest. He alleged a contractual right to state employment in a particular area. The defendant agency demurred, admitting allegations of the contractual nature of employment. This court, in affirming judgment of dismissal, stated: “It is true that a demurrer assumes the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, and it is also true that a contract may ordinarily be pleaded by its legal effect. Implicit in plaintiff’s allegations, however, is the claim that the State Personnel Board had authority to promise on behalf of the state that plaintiff would not be required to serve elsewhere than in Southern California. Since the board’s authority is governed by the Constitution and by the Civil Service Act... the scope of that authority is a question of law and may properly be considered on demurrer. . . . The terms and conditions of civil service employment are fixed by statute and not by contract. . . . The statutory provisions controlling the terms and conditions of civil service employment cannot be circumvented by purported contracts in conflict therewith. . . .” (Id., at pp. 640-641; see also Martin v. Henderson (1953) 40 Cal.2d 583, 590 [ 255 P.2d 416 ]; City of San Diego v. American Federation of State Etc. Employees (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 308, 312 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 258 ].) County employees, like state employees, cannot claim property rights grounded on personal service contracts. “The terms and conditions relating to employment by a public agency are strictly controlled by statute or ordinance, rather than by ordinary contractual standards . . . .” (Markman v. County of Los Angeles (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 132, 134 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 610 ].)

The terms of Mr. Williams’ employment were fixed by rules enacted by the County of Los Angeles Civil Service Commission. (County of Los Angeles Charter, art. IX, § 34; see Cal.Const., art. XI, § 3, subd. (a).) *739 Their enforcement may not be delegated—for instance, to plaintiff’s immediate employer, the Los Angeles County Department of Recreation and Parks. (Schecter v. County of Los Angeles (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 391, 396-397 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 739 ].) Plaintiff’s employment rights were thus fixed by the rules of the Civil Service Commission and, for the reasons heretofore noted, were not altered by alleged contractual arrangements. The complaint thus contains no allegation of a property interest entitled to due process protections.

In Skelly we struggled to determine the existence of a protectable property right in the case of a state employee achieving “permanent employee” status. (Skelly v. State Personnel Board, supra, 15 Cal.3d 194, 206-208 .) Today the majority completely ignore the need for ascertaining existence of the particular property interest meriting due process protections. It follows then that a public agency.can no longer terminate any employee, whatever his status, without affording him full Skelly due process procedures.

I concur with the majority insofar as the judgment is affirmed as to count three, and I dissent insofar as the judgment is reversed as to counts one and two.

I would affirm the judgment of dismissal in its entirety.

Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied December 27, 1978. Clark, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

The issues are presented on sustaining of demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff alleges he “entered into an agreement whereby Defendants . . . employed Plaintiff. . . for the summer season of 1975 commencing on or about June 16,1975.”