holding that, where the board is vested with discretion by statute, it may limit its own discretion in its rules
How later courts described this case
- holding that, where the board is vested with discretion by statute, it may limit its own discretion in its rules
- remanding to the parole board to reconsider its decision to defer a prisoner’s release after the court concluded that the board had applied the wrong legal analysis and, as a result, made its decision based on evidence that was not relevant
- reading a psychologist’s report “as a whole,” the Board could find that the inmate had a present severe emotional disturbance
- “An agency which is vested with discretion by statute may limit its own discre- tion in its regulations.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Criticized by Howey v. Johnson, 161 Or. App. 108 (1999)
However, I persist in the view that Peek was incorrectly decided for one or more of the reasons stated in the dissent in that case.
The opinion
WARREN, S. J.,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that the Board erred in fading to determine whether the psychological report made a finding of severe emotional disturbance. That requires a remand to the Board to make that determination. The majority’s discussion of the contents of the psychological report is unnecessary to our decision to remand and is inappropriate.