The opinion
J. Gladwin, Judge, dissenting. While agreeing with the majority opinion in other regards, I dissent from the conclusion that the language of the assault and battery endorsement is ambiguous. In my view, the exclusion unambiguously excludes all assaults, including those committed by patrons. I would, therefore, affirm the trial court’s finding that the policy did not provide coverage for appellants’ claims.
The language in an insurance policy is to be construed in its plain, ordinary, popular sense. Insurance Co. of North America v. Forrest City Country Club, 36 Ark. App. 124 , 819 S.W.2d 296 (1991). Under Arkansas law, the intent to exclude coverage in an insurance policy should be expressed in clear and unambiguous language. Baskette v. Union Life Ins. Co., 9 Ark. App. 34 , 652 S.W.2d 635 (1983). In order to be ambiguous, a term in an insurance policy must be susceptible to more than one reasonable construction. Insurance Co. of North America, supra. If the terms of an insurance contract are not ambiguous, it is unnecessary to resort to the rules of construction; in such cases, the policy will not be interpreted to bind the insurer to a risk which it plainly excluded and for which it was not paid. First Financial Insurance Co. v. National Indem. Co., 49 Ark. App. 115 , 898 S.W.2d 63 (1995).
The endorsement containing the assault and battery exclusion stated:
This insurance does not apply to Bodily Injury or Property Damage arising from:
A. Assault and Battery committed by any insured, any employee of any insured, or any other person, whether committed by or at the direction of any insured (emphasis added);
B. The failure to suppress or prevent Assault and Battery by any person in A. above; or
C. The negligent hiring, supervision or training of any employee of the insured.
Contracts of insurance should receive a practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the apparent object and intent of the parties in the light of their general object and purpose. First Financial, supra. It is well settled that the intent of the parties is to be determined from the whole context of the agreement and that the court must consider the instrument in its entirety, not merely disjointed or particular parts of it. Alberson v. Automobile Club Interins. Exch., 71 Ark. App. 162 , 27 S.W.3d 447 (2000).
I believe the language of the policy clearly reflects the intent to exclude coverage for assault and battery committed by the insured, an employee, or any other person. A patron qualifies as “any other person.” The language of Subsections A and B, read together as part of the instrument in its entirety and construed in its plain and ordinary sense, excludes all assaults and not just those committed by or at the direction of the insured. I see no ambiguity here, thus no reason to bind the insurer to a risk that it plainly excluded. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Griffen, Vaught and Crabtree, JJ., agree.