Opinion

Commonwealth v. Moore

  • 569 Pa. 508
  • 805 A.2d 1212
  • 2002 Pa. LEXIS 1826
Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Aug 28, 2002
Status
Published
Author
Newman
On the bench
Zappala, C.J., and Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman, Saylor and Eakin
Cited by
21 cases
Authority
More cited than 7.0%

restating rule that, so as to ensure zealous advocacy on defendant's behalf, public defender may not assert ineffective assistance claim against another public defender in same office

How later courts described this case

  • restating rule that, so as to ensure zealous advocacy on defendant's behalf, public defender may not assert ineffective assistance claim against another public defender in same office
  • Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court
  • Opinion Announcing Judgment of Court

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Tharp, 627 Pa. 673 (2014)

    Moore is clearly distinguishable, however, because the defendant in that case argued self-defense at trial, which is not mutually exclusive from the defense of diminished capacity.
    Supreme Court of PennsylvaniaSep 24, 2014Read it

The opinion

Justice NEWMAN

concurring and dissenting.

I join the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Castille. I write separately to emphasize my disagreement with the assertion by the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court, in footnote 3, that Commonwealth v. Pursell, 555 Pa. 233 , 724 A.2d 293 (1999), requires this Court to treat Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of post conviction counsel as ripe for review, even though presented for the first time in a petition for allowance of appeal. Pursell was an appeal from the dismissal of a timely post conviction petition in a capital case. Although we examined Pursell’s claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel, that review occurred in the context of our mandatory appellate jurisdiction in PCRA capital cases. Mandatory capital PCRA appellate review implicates considerations that simply are not present in a petition for allowance of appeal, in a non-capital PCRA case, where it is within our discretion to accept or decline review. Consequently, I do not believe that our capital PCRA jurisprudence serves as a useful paradigm for resolving this problem within our system of discretionary review.

I agree with Mr. Justice Castille’s position that the allocatur process is not designed for review of claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel raised in a petition for allowance of appeal. This Court does a disservice to the allocatur *542 process — the vehicle by which we set policy for the Commonwealth on “special and important” matters — when we entertain claims for which there has been no prior appellate review.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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