holding that “doctors must provide patients with” sufficient information to “give the patient ‘a true understanding of the nature of the operation to be performed, the seiiousness of it, the organs of the body involved, the diseasé or incapacity sought to be cured, and the possible results’ ”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “doctors must provide patients with” sufficient information to “give the patient ‘a true understanding of the nature of the operation to be performed, the seiiousness of it, the organs of the body involved, the diseasé or incapacity sought to be cured, and the possible results’ ”
- holding that a medical facility lacks control over the manner in which a physician performs his/her duty to obtain informed consent, and cannot be vicariously liable for breach of that duty
- describing “an operation performed without the patient’s consent” as a “technical assault” that “sounds in the intentional tort of battery”
- “a battery which results from a lack of informed consent is not the type of action that occurs within the scope of employment”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice SAYLOR
concurring and dissenting.
With regard to the issue of informed consent as it pertains to Dr. Morros’ attempted placement of the Permacath, I join the majority opinion, as I agree that the doctrine of informed consent, at least under the presently prevailing interpretation of the pertinent statute, see generally Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal, 568 Pa. 574 , 798 A.2d 742 (2002), does not encompass a choice among alternative sites for performing a surgical procedure such as the insertion of a Permacath. 1
As to whether a hospital may be held vicariously liable for an employee-physician’s failure to obtain a patient’s informed consent, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that it cannot, and, as to this issue, join Mr. Justice Nigro’s dissenting opinion to the contrary.
. As I noted in Montgomery, at least the argument can be made that the General Assembly's recent amendments to the statute incorporate negligence concepts. See id. at 591-92 , 798 A.2d at 753 (Saylor, J., concurring).