new evidence established prima facie case for actual innocence because, taken together with medical examiner's trial testimony, it would mean that "the jury would no longer have any affirmative evidence to cause it to prefer the theory that [the deceased] was murdered as opposed to the theory that he was killed accidentally or with some lesser culpable mental state than is necessary to sustain a capital murder conviction"
How later courts described this case
- new evidence established prima facie case for actual innocence because, taken together with medical examiner's trial testimony, it would mean that "the jury would no longer have any affirmative evidence to cause it to prefer the theory that [the deceased] was murdered as opposed to the theory that he was killed accidentally or with some lesser culpable mental state than is necessary to sustain a capital murder conviction"
- State failed in its burden of production because evidence presented no rational basis for jury to prefer the theory that intent to obtain or maintain control over property was formulated before or during the homicide rather than after
- new evidence that short- distance falls could have caused the infant victim’s head injuries was a material exculpatory fact undermining expert testimony at trial that short-distance falls could not cause such injuries
- "That material [affidavits and reports of several scientists] indicates that what is called the biomedical analysis of infant head trauma (an area of scientific research that was beginning to develop in 1995 when applicant was tried and convicted) now shows that the type of head injuries that Brandon Baugh suffered could have been caused by an accidental short fall onto concrete."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KELLER, P.J.,
dissenting in which HERVEY, J. joined.
Before a court can consider the merits of a habeas application, the application must contain sufficient facts establishing one of the three exceptions listed in Article 11.071, § 5(a). 1 The facts alleged in the present application, even if accepted as true, do not establish any of the exceptions listed in § 5. In Ex parte Staley, we explained that an applicant could not meet the § 5(a)(1) exception on the basis of new law simply by relying upon United States Supreme Court cases that established new law. 2 He was still required to show that the facts in his case fit “under the umbrel *693 la of that ‘new* legal claim.” 3 Similarly, new facts can show a new factual basis under § 5(a)(1) only if the new facts would establish a claim upon which relief could be granted. Even assuming that the new medical research constitutes “new facts” that were unavailable at the time the previous application was filed, those new facts, even if accepted, do not establish any recognized claim for relief. Consequently, the statutory scheme requires this Court to dismiss the application. Because the Court does not, I respectfully dissent.
. Tex.Code Crim. Proc., Art. 11.071, § 5(a).
. 160 S.W.3d 56, 63-64 (Tex.Crim.App.2005).
. Id.