holding a district court’s explanation—although “brief and somewhat opaque”— procedurally reasonable where “the record as a whole shows that the court adequately considered [the defendant’s] mitigating arguments and provided a reasoned basis for the sentence that it imposed.”
How later courts described this case
- holding a district court’s explanation—although “brief and somewhat opaque”— procedurally reasonable where “the record as a whole shows that the court adequately considered [the defendant’s] mitigating arguments and provided a reasoned basis for the sentence that it imposed.”
- holding that the district court did not err in denying the defendant’s request for a variance where the court properly noted that the Guidelines were advisory, discussed the § 3553(a) factors, and explained its reasons for the sentence imposed within the Guidelines range
- holding that the district court did not commit a “ ‘significant procedural error’ ” by not explicitly addressing an undeveloped mitigating argument (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586)
- holding delay reasonably necessary where the outcome of the proceedings was “plainly relevant to the federal determination of whether or not [the defendant] had actually violated the conditions of his supervised release” (internal quotation marks omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in 05-4304 and dissenting in 06-3736.
I agree with the majority that the district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3583® to sanction Tyrone Madden for his admitted supervised-release violation. However, because the district court did not adequately explain why it rejected Diana Blaine Brown’s (“Brown”) arguments seeking a lower sentence, I cannot find Brown’s sentence reasonable. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would remand Brown’s case for resentencing.
The district court committed procedural error in this case because the court failed to mention or address one of Brown’s central arguments for a lower sentence, namely, that her offense represented “aberrant behavior” and “truly was a marked deviation from an otherwise law-abiding life.” J.A. at 116-17 (Sent. Mem. at 7-8). Even when Brown’s counsel specifically requested that the court rule on Brown’s motion, the court’s curt response ignored every argument raised in the motion. Instead, the court denied the motion because the court had already given Brown a separate Guidelines-based downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, an issue that Brown’s motion did not even mention. Even the majority recognizes that the district court’s failure to mention Brown’s aberrant-behavior argument during the hearing is “troubling],” Maj. Op. at 611, and that the court’s ruling on Brown’s motion was “imperfect.” Maj. Op. at 612. Applying a downward adjustment in calculating a defendant’s Guidelines range does not excuse a sentencing judge from addressing the defendant’s other arguments for a lower sentence. Indeed, such an irrelevant and non-responsive answer fails to “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that [the district court] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468 , 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). Accordingly, I would remand so that the district court can consider Brown’s arguments and explain the rationale for whatever sentence the district court selects. I respectfully dissent.