determining that proposing marriage, allowing a ceremony to be planned, and then withdrawing the promise to marry "only hours before the time scheduled for the ceremony" because the defendant had been married to another person the entire time "may very well be considered outrageous"
How later courts described this case
- determining that proposing marriage, allowing a ceremony to be planned, and then withdrawing the promise to marry "only hours before the time scheduled for the ceremony" because the defendant had been married to another person the entire time "may very well be considered outrageous"
- stating that the issue of what theories would support a recovery of economic damages "should be addressed ... only when it is properly presented to [the clourt and properly argued by the parties"
- preserving the right to maintain action, explaining that “losses . . . may be recoverable under a theory of reasonable reliance or breach of contract” and permitting intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where defendant was already married, participated with the plaintiff in planning a wedding with her, but on the morning of the wedding told her he would not marry her
- abolishing action for breach of promise to marry without conducting Berry analysis even though this court had previously recognized such an action
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice,
concurring in part in the result:
I concur in most of the majority opinion but cannot concur in the dictum that “any economic losses suffered because of Jackson’s reasonable reliance on Brown’s promise to marry her (such as normal expenses attendant to a wedding) may be recoverable under a theory of reasonable reliance or breach of contract.” That issue should be addressed, in my view, only when it. is properly presented to this Court and properly argued by the parties.
I concur in the remainder of the opinion.
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., and RUSSON, J., concur in STEWART, A.C.J., opinion.