"The ERA absolutely prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex and is not subject to even the narrow exceptions permitted under traditional `strict scrutiny'."
How later courts described this case
- "The ERA absolutely prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex and is not subject to even the narrow exceptions permitted under traditional `strict scrutiny'."
- "A person has standing to raise constitutional questions when his interest is a ' "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.” ’ ”
- upholding similar state statute under state equal rights amendment
- “Under the equal rights amendment, the equal protection/suspect classification test is replaced by the single criterion: Is the classification by sex discriminatory?”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Stafford, J.
(concurring in the dissent) — I concur in the dissent except insofar as it appears to elevate footnote 8 in Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wn.2d 859, 872 , 540 P.2d 882 (1975) to the status of a holding. In the footnote we merely commented that "three possible exceptions" to the federal equal rights amendment were discussed in Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis of Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale L.J. 871 , 904 (1971). (Italics mine.) We did not hold that there were in fact three exceptions to the absolute ban of classifications based upon sex under the equal rights amendment (Const. art. 31, § 1). Further, none of the three possible exceptions applied in Darrin v. Gould, supra, and none apply here. Thus, we should follow the lead of Darrin and again refrain from deciding either whether such exceptions exist or whether they are absolutes, until the issue is properly before us.